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the Brief of Appellant Tremco Legal Solutions, Inc., filed and served July 21, 2003.
On page 21 of Tremco's brief, the first two sentences at the top of that page
currently read as follows:

1

On April 10, 2002, the district court, Judge Howard,
heard argument on the various motions. (R. 1033.) Only
counsel forTremco and SoftSolutions, Inc. were provided
notice or attended that hearing. (R. 1008, 1033.)
The second sentence should be corrected so that the term "BYU" replaces the term
"SoftSolutions, Inc." so that the two sentences, as corrected, read as follows:
On April 10, 2002, the district court, Judge Howard,
heard argument on the various motions. (R. 1033.) Only
counsel for Tremco and BYU were provided notice or
attended that hearing. (R. 1008, 1033.)
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(3)0), 78-2a-3(2),
because this is an appeal from a judgment and final orders of a court of record over which
the Utah Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
This appeal presents two sets of issues. The first set of issues relates to whether
appellant Tremco Legal Solutions, Inc. ("Tremco") is liable to pay a judgment entered
against a separate judgment debtor, SoftSolutions, Inc., in an action to which Tremco was
not a party, that confirmed an arbitration proceeding to which Tremco was not a party. On
cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court, Judge Fred D. Howard, ruled that
Tremco is liable to pay for that separate judgment. These issues are as follows:
1.

Whether Tremco's right to due process was violated by Judge Howard's

Ruling requiring Tremco to pay a judgment to which it was not a party and which had been
entered in an action to which it was not a party, involving an arbitration to which it was not
a party. (R. 914-17.)
2.

Whether Judge Howard's Ruling, requiring Tremco to pay a judgment to

which it was not a party, was fundamentally contrary to law because Tremco is a separate
corporation from the corporation against which the judgment was entered and there has been
neither allegation nor proof of alter ego liability. (R. 725-27.)
3.

Whether Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 17(d) renders Tremco liable to pay a

judgment to which it was not a party, even though:

1

a.

Rule 17(d) merely provides a procedural rule for bringing an action against a

partnership or association, and Tremco was never a partner/member of any
partnership or association with the separate judgment debtor corporation;
b.

there was no judgment entered against any association of which Tremco was

alleged to be a member, but only against the other corporation individually.
(R. 722-25, 904-08.)
4.

Whether the doctrine of res judicata renders Tremco liable to pay a judgment

entered against a separate corporation in an action to which Tremco was not a party and
involving an arbitration to which Tremco was not a party. (R. 907-11.)
5.

Whether Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1408, which allows enforcement of a claim

of a corporation's creditor against a shareholder receiving assets in liquidation of that
corporation, a constructive trust theory, or a fraudulent transfer theory render Tremco liable
to pay a judgment entered against a separate corporation in an action to which Tremco was
not a party even though Tremco received no assets and there were no transfers from the
judgment debtor. (R. 719.)
6.

Whether an indemnity agreement that did not obligate Tremco to indemnify

the judgment debtor and to which BYU,1 the judgment creditor, is not a party or third-party
beneficiary renders Tremco liable to pay a judgment against a separate corporation in an
action to which Tremco was not a party. (R. 720-22, 912-17.)
7.

1

Whether the Affidavit of Kenneth W. Duncan ("Duncan Affidavit") submitted

Appellee Brigham Young University is referred to herein as "BYU."
2

by Tremco in support of its motion for summary judgment is inadmissible in its entirety
because:
a.

Portions of the Affidavit allegedly contradicted an arbitrator's ruling, making

the Affidavit inadmissible on the theory that the arbitrator's ruling was "law of the
case," even though the arbitrator's ruling was made in an arbitration proceeding to
which Tremco was not a party and which was separate from the action below;
b.

the Affidavit was inadmissible under the parol evidence rule even though the

Affidavit was not submitted for the purpose of altering the terms any agreement;
c.

the Affidavit was made without personal knowledge, even though Mr.

Duncan, the affiant, was a corporate officer making statements regarding the
corporation; and
d.

the Affidavit made legal conclusions even though the Affidavit merely sets

forth facts that touch upon legal issues. (R. 933-43.)
The second set of issues relates to the proceedings in the district court that transpired
after Judge Howard entered the May 14, 2002 Ruling and June 13, 2002 Judgment against
Tremco, which he certified as final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Such proceedings include entry of a July 10, 2002 Order, that extended the new Judgment
against Tremco to Duncan, et al.2 These issues are as follows:
1.

Whether Duncan, et al. are liable to pay a judgment to which they are not a

2

Lee A. Duncan, Kenneth W. Duncan, Alvin S. Tedjamulia, Julee Associates L.C.,
AST Associates, L.C. and KWD Associates, L.C. are referred to collectively herein as
"Duncan, et al."
3

party, even though they have never been named as a party defendant in a complaint or served
a summons and such complaint, and were not served B YU's motions upon which the July
10, 2002 Order was based. (R. 1180-83, 1484-88, 1499; R. 3943 at 97-102, 104-05.)
2.

Whether a sale of stock in a corporation was a fraudulent transfer of that

corporation's assets justifying execution against the money received by the sellers for that
stock? (R. 857-60, 900-01, 1206-08.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Except with regard to the Duncan Affidavit, because the district court ruled upon
these motions and decided all issues raised therein as a matter of law, this Court accords no
deference to the district court's determinations, but rather reviews them de novo. Prince v.
Bear River Mut. Ins. Co.. 2002 UT 68, f 14; Culbertson v. Board of County Comm'rs. 2001
UT 108, nil , 44 P.3d 642; Gerbich v. Numed Inc.. 977 P.2d 1205, 1207 (Utah 1999);
Bowler v. Desert Village Ass'n. 922 P.2d 8, 11 (Utah 1998).
Summary judgment is appropriate if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c);
see Nova Cas. Co. v. Able Constr., Inc.. 1999 UT 69,^6,983 P.2d 575. This Court reviews
for correctness whether the district court properly entered summary judgment. Nova Cas.
Co.. l999UT69,at1f6.
Regarding the Duncan Affidavit, although this Court generally will overturn the
determination to strike an affidavit for an abuse of discretion, In re General Determination
of the Rights to the Use of All the Water. 1999 UT 39, 1J25, 982 P.2d 65, the legal

4

determinations upon which that decision is based are reviewed for correctness. Ong Int'l
(U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp.. 850 P.2d 447, 452 (Utah 1993).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
This case is governed by the following:
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, § 1, clause 2:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Utah Constitution, Article 1, § 7:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without
due process of law.
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1405 (2001), Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1408 (2001), and Utah
Rule of Civil Procedure 17, set out in the Addendum as Exhibits 1, 2, and 3, respectively.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings3
This case presents a situation where a district court has acted far outside the law and
in contravention of Tremco's due process rights, to hold Tremco vicariously liable to pay
a judgment to which it was not a party, which was entered in an action to which it was not
a party and which involved confirmation of an arbitration proceeding to which it was not a
party. Accordingly, this case strikes at the heart of limited corporate liability enacted by the
3

The Statement of Facts below expands on the procedural events outlined in this
section, because most of the facts relevant to the appeal are procedural facts.
5

Utah Legislature and the circumstances in which one corporation can be held liable to pay
a judgment rendered against a distinct corporation in the absence of any allegation or proof
of alter ego, and where the only evidence before the district court rebutted the existence of
any joint venture or partnership. This case demonstrates the fundamental collapse of
procedural due process of law by binding Tremco not just to the determinations in an
arbitration brought upon an arbitration agreement to which Tremco was not a party, but also
making Tremco liable to pay the judgment confirming that award obtained against another
entity. Due process of law further collapsed by stretching the judgment against Tremco,
without jurisdiction, to third parties who were never named as party defendants in any
complaint, never served with a summons and such complaint, and who were never provided
any opportunity to be heard on the merits of their individual liability.
This case initially arose from a dispute regarding patent royalties that BYU claimed
were owed to it by SoftSolutions, Inc., a Utah corporation. BYU and SoftSolutions, Inc.
arbitrated that dispute pursuant to an arbitration clause in a 1990 license agreement between
BYU and SoftSolutions, Inc. (R. 1-56.) Only BYU and SoftSolutions, Inc. were parties to
that agreement and that arbitration. Tremco was not a party to the arbitration. The arbitrator
rendered an award for BYU and against SoftSolutions, Inc.
In 1996, SoftSolutions, Inc. initiated the action between it and BYU, case number
960400497 (the "1996 Case"), by bringing a declaratory judgment action to vacate the
arbitration award against SoftSolutions, Inc. Only SoftSolutions, Inc. and BYU were parties
to that action. Tremco was not a party to that action. Judge Howard confirmed the

6

arbitration and entered "judgment against SoftSolutions, Inc.," and only against
SoftSolutions, Inc. (the "1998 Judgment"). (R. 283.4) SoftSolutions, Inc. appealed that
Judgment to this Court, Case No. 981481. In a May 19,2000 decision, this Court affirmed
the 1998 Judgment in part and reversed it in part.5
Meanwhile, in 2000, BYU brought a separate action against Tremco, case number
000400088 (the "2000 Case"), seeking to make Tremco liable to pay the 1998 Judgment
against SoftSolutions, Inc. (R2000.1-96.)6 BYU alleged Tremco could be held liable to pay
that Judgment as a corporation affiliated with SoftSolutions, Inc. through common
shareholders and officers, upon partnership and other theories. (R2000. 1-96.)
Tremco filed a counterclaim for breaches of contract and the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, seeking to recover damages caused by BYU's failure to
adequately defend the patent of DSearch, an algorithm separately licensed to Tremco
pursuant to two agreements entered in 1987 and 1988, and because the DSearch algorithm
was defective. On July 25, 2000, after this Court issued its May 19, 2000 decision on the
appeal of the 1998 Judgment entered in the 1996 Case, Judge Gary D. Stott entered an Order
consolidating the 2000 Case into the 1996 Case. (R2000. 383-86.)
Thereafter, BYU moved to dismiss Tremco's counterclaims on the grounds they were

4

The 1998 Judgment is in the Addendum as Exhibit 4.

SoftSolutions. Inc. v. Brigham Young Univ.. 2000 UT 46, 1 P.3d 1095.
6

The clerk of the district court has numbered both the record in the 2000 Case and
the record in the 1996 Case (into which the 2000 Case was consolidated) beginning with
page 1. For clarity, Tremco refers to the pre-consolidation record in the 2000 Case as
"R2000" and the record in the 1996 Case as "R."
7

barred by res judicata or the statute of limitations. (R. 488-91.) Tremco moved for summary
judgment on BYU's claims stating those claims failed and were otherwise defeated by the
undisputed material facts and that Tremco could not be held liable to pay the 1998 Judgment
rendered against SoftSolutions, Inc. in the action to which Tremco was not a party. (R. 677831.) B YU, then moved for partial summary judgment and declaratory relief, repeating
many of its earlier arguments, but also seeking a declaration that a sale of stock constituted
a fraudulent transfer. (R. 846-81.) BYU also moved to strike the Duncan Affidavit. BYU
prevailed on its and Tremco's motions. (R. 882-88.)

STATEMENT OF FACTS7
I.

THE RECORD IS CLEAR THAT TREMCO, SOFTSOLUTIONS, INC., AND
SOFTSOLUTIONS TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION ARE SEPARATE
CORPORATE ENTITIES
A.

Tremco Legal Solutions, Inc.

Appellant Tremco is a Utah Corporation. (R. 509-13.) Tremco was originally
incorporated in 1982 as Tremco Consultants, Inc. and later changed its name to Tremco
Legal Solutions, Inc. (R. 830.) Tremco has maintained its corporate status constantly since
its formation in 1982, has never been dissolved or liquidated, and is currently a Utah
Corporation in good standing. (R. 509-13, 829.) Tremco's officers and directors have
regularly engaged in meetings appropriate for Tremco's operation and routinely filed annual
7

Tremco states the relevant facts in the light most favorable to denying BYU's
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, as this Court must view them. Houghton v.
Department of Health. 2002 UT 101,^2, 57 P.3d 1067, cert, denied. 71 U.S.L.W. 3623
(2003). Further, regarding Tremco's Motion for Summary Judgment, Tremco recites
only the facts supported by evidence in the record that was not contradicted by evidence
proffered by BYU. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e).
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reports with the Utah Division Corporations. Tremco held corporate directors and officers
meetings, paid its officers salaries and its shareholders dividends, and there was no
siphoning of corporate funds or intermingling of corporate and personal funds. (R. 829.)
Since its incorporation in 1982 until only recently, Tremco has been actively engaged
in the business of computer software development, software consulting, and providing
hardware and technical support. (R. 829.) Tremco's business focused exclusively within
the market of law firms and law departments, by developing and selling software that
managed time and billing, performed checks for conflicts of interest, and otherwise
organized and managed documents. (R. 829) Accordingly, Tremco's business was
providing services to law firms, including a wide-range of products specific to law firms.
Tremco's business has been significantly reduced overtime due to changes in the technology
markets, but until recently continued to provide support for its software to the
internationally-based law firm of Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker, LLP. (R. 824-25.)
When Tremco was first incorporated, its directors and officers were Kenneth W.
Duncan ("K. Duncan"), Alvin S. Tedjamulia ("Tedjamulia"), and Lee A. Duncan ("L.
Duncan"). (R. 830.) Except for a period in 1994, they have continued to serve Tremco in
that capacity until the present.

(R. 830.) During that period in 1994, K. Duncan,

Tedjamulia, and L. Duncan remained directors of Tremco, but another individual, Dan
Oldroyd, was Tremco's sole officer, serving as its General Manager. (R. 830.)
During the late 1980s until June 1989, Tremco did business under the name
"SoftSolutions Legal Solutions." (R. 829.) In June 1989, Tremco relinquished the name
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"SoftSolutions" to KAL5 Inc. (discussed below). (R. 829-30.)
B.

KAL, Inc./SoftSoIutions, Inc. and SoftSolutions Technology Corporation

Like Tremco, SoftSolutions, Inc. and SoftSolutions Technology Corporation
("S.T.C.") are each Utah corporations. Tremco has never been a shareholder of either
SoftSolutions, Inc. or S.T.C. (R. 826.) The only connection between Tremco, and
SoftSolutions, Inc. and S.T.C. was an imperfect commonality between them of officers,
directors, and shareholders.
In 1988, K. Duncan, Tedjamulia, and L. Duncan incorporated KAL, Inc. as a Utah
corporation. (R. 505-07, 830.) In June 1989, Tremco relinquished to KAL, Inc. the right
to use the name "SoftSolutions" and, on June 14, 1989, KAL, Inc. changed its name to
SoftSolutions, Inc. (R. 693.)
In 1989, S.T.C. was incorporated as a Utah corporation named SoftSolutions
Marketing, Inc., and later changed its name to SoftSolutions Technology corporation. (R.
327-28.) S.T.C. was formed to be an affiliate of SoftSolutions, Inc. KAL, Inc. was initially
incorporated as an entity to hold technology licenses that would be used by the affiliated
corporation S.T.C. (R. 828.) Eventually, splitting the holder and user of the technology
licenses between two corporations became impracticable, and SoftSolutions, Inc. assigned
all its technology licenses to S.T.C. (R. 827.)
S.T.C.'s business focused on developing and marketing software for use on local area
networks ("LANs") in a wide variety of businesses. (R. 828.) Accordingly, S.T.C.'s
business differed fundamentally from Tremco's: Tremco focused its business on software
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for mini-computers with terminals used by law firms while S.T.C. focused on creating
personal computer-based LAN software that could be used by a variety of businesses.
By 1992, SoftSolutions, Inc. had ceased to actively carry on business, and all its
technology licenses had previously been assigned to S.T.C. Accordingly, in November
1992, SoftSolutions, Inc. allowed itself to be dissolved for failure to file an annual report.
(R. 328.) At the time of its dissolution, SoftSolutions, Inc. had no assets and, therefore, no
assets were transferred to its shareholders. (R. 826.) Likewise, no assets were transferred
to Tremco or S.T.C. on SoftSolutions, Inc.'s dissolution. (R. 826.) After November 1992,
SoftSolutions, Inc.'s activity was limited to the winding up of corporate affairs. (R. 828.)
C.

There was no partnership between Tremco and SoftSolutions, Inc.

There has never been an entity, unincorporated or otherwise, named "SoftSolutions
Association" of which Tremco was a party. (R. 827.) Tremco and SoftSolutions, Inc. did
not, and had no agreement to, combine money, property, or efforts to pursue a common
purpose and share profits and losses. (R. 827-28.) Rather, Tremco pursued its unique
business, marketing mini-computer based software to law firms and legal departments.
SoftSolutions, Inc.'s business was holding technology licenses that S.T.C. used in marketing
its personal computer-based software - different software than marketed by Tremco - to a
variety of businesses. (R. 827-28.)
II.

TREMCO HAD A DIFFERENT DSEARCH LICENSE AGREEMENT THAN
SOFTSOLUTIONS, INC.
A.

Tremco's DSearch Licence Agreements

In the late 1980s, Tremco was developing and producing legal time and billing
11

software for law firms and law departments. (R. 829.) To that end, in 1987, Tremco entered
into an agreement with BYU dated April 27, 1987, whereby BYU granted Tremco a
nonexclusive license to use a technology owned by BYU - the DSearch algorithm (the
" 1987 Agreement"). (R. 829,806-21;R2000.245-61.) Tremco entered the 1987 agreement
so that it could use the DSearch algorithm to develop indexing and retrieval software for use
by law firms. (R2000. 245-261; R. 806-21, 829.)
Thereafter, BYU and Tremco entered a second license agreement for the DSearch
algorithm, dated May 2,1988 (the " 1988 Agreement"). (R. 763-803; R2000.263-305.) The
1988 Agreement expressly provided that it was intended to replace the 1987 Agreement:
"The terms of this Agreement shall supersede the terms of the Agreement entered into April
28,1987, between BYU and TREMCO CONSULTANTS, INC." (R. 803.) Both the 1987
Agreement and 1988 Agreement granted Tremco a non-exclusive license. Because it was
entered before Tremco sold the d/b/a "SoftSolutions" to KAL, Inc. in 1989, the 1988
Agreement recognized that at the time Tremco was doing business under the name
"SoftSolutions." (R. 803.)
Tremco used the DSearch algorithm in its software and paid royalties to BYU
pursuant to the 1987 and 1988 Agreements. (R. 829.) Neither the 1987 Agreement nor
the 1988 Agreement contained any arbitration clause. (R. 747-821.) Further, even after
the 1990 Agreement between SoftSolutions, Inc. and BYU (discussed immediately below),
Tremco continued to market its existing products pursuant to its separate 1988 Agreement,
and made royalty payments to BYU in accordance with that 1988 Agreement. (R. 728,825.)
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B.

SoftSolutions, Inc.'s DSearch Licence Agreement

In 1990, after Tremco relinquished the name "SoftSolutions" to KAL, Inc., and KAL,
Inc. changed its name to SoftSolutions, Inc., B YU entered a separate license agreement with
SoftSolutions, Inc. BYU's agreement with SoftSolutions, Inc., dated June 1,1990, ("1990
Agreement") granted SoftSolutions, Inc. an exclusive (except as to existing licensees)
license to DSearch. (R. 747.) Consistent with SoftSolutions, Inc. holding technology
licenses for S.T.C. to use in creating and marketing its software, the terms of the 1990
Agreement calculated royalties due on the software sold by both SoftSolutions, Inc. and its
affiliates. (R. 758.) S.T.C. was an affiliate of SoftSolutions, Inc. as defined in § 1.1 of the
1990 Agreement. (R. 780-81.)
Tremco was not a party to the 1990 Agreement and the 1990 Agreement recognized
and explicitly recited that Tremco was a different entity with a different existing license to
DSearch under the 1988 Agreement. Section 2.5 of the 1990 Agreement provides:
SOFTSOLUTIONS recognizes that BYU has previously issued DSEARCH
licenses to the following companies and entities: Creative Index, Inc.,
ECHO Solutions, Inc., the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints,
Linguatech, Inc., Tremco, Inc., and Larson-Davis, Inc.
(R. 758-59 (emphasis added).)
Aside from § 2.5's recognition that Tremco was a different corporate entity with a
different DSearch license agreement, the 1990 Agreement made no other mention of
Tremco. The 1990 Agreement contained absolutely nothing indicating it was intended to
replace or supplant the 1988 Agreement with Tremco. Indeed, the 1990 Agreement with
SoftSolutions, Inc. was unrelated to the 1988 Agreement with Tremco, was materially
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different from the 1988 Agreement with Tremco, and contained royalty terms appropriate
for SoftSolutions, Inc.'s and S.T.C.'s different products and markets. (R. 827.)
In stark contrast to BYU's 1987 Agreement and 1988 Agreement with Tremco, the
1990 Agreement with SoftSolutions, Inc. contained an arbitration clause. § 15.1 provided:
In the event, after one or more mediation sessions, either party believes the
mediation process is not likely to resolve the dispute by mutual agreement, the
dispute shall be resolved by final and binding arbitration in Provo, Utah.
(R. 749 (emphasis added).)
III.

THE 1994 STOCK SALE OF SOFTSOLUTIONS TECHNOLOGY
CORPORATION AND THE INDEMNIFICATION AGREEMENT
In 1994, the shareholders of S.T.C., none of whom were Tremco or SoftSolutions,

Inc., sold their stock to WordPerfect Corporation. (R. 826.) That sale was a stock sale, not
an asset sale, and S.T.C. continued in existence after the sale. Accordingly, the stock sale
made no transfer of S.T.C.'s assets, including any rights to use DSearch, and following the
sale all of S.T.C.'s assets remained intact. (R. 826, 1386.) Because Tremco was not a
shareholder of S.T.C. it received no assets from the sale of the stock of S.T.C. (R. 826.)
Before the January 1994 stock sale, WordPerfect became aware of the impending
dispute regarding DSearch royalties between BYU and SoftSolutions, Inc. (R. 826.)
WordPerfect was aware that BYU claimed SoftSolutions, Inc. owed it unpaid royalties. (R.
826.) WordPerfect was also aware that S.T.C. and Tremco each had their own claims for
damages caused by defects in the DSearch Technology. (R. 826.) Because of a similarity
in issues, and cognizant of a risk that in the future BYU might pursue S.T.C, rather than just
SoftSolutions, Inc., for payment of DSearch royalties, WordPerfect required, and Tremco
14

agreed, to protect WordPerfect in the event BYU asserted new claims against S.T.C. by
entering the January 10, 1994 Indemnification Agreement.8 (R. 521-22, 744-45, 826.)
Only Tremco and S.T.C. were parties to the 1994 Indemnification Agreement. As
the agreement provided: "THIS AGREEMENT is made and entered into as of this 10th day
of

January,

1994,

by

and

between

SOFTSOLUTIONS

TECHNOLOGY

CORPORATION, a Utah corporation ([referred to herein as] "SoftSolutions"), and
TREMCO CONSULTANTS, INC., a Utah corporation ("Tremco")." (R. 522 (emphasis
added).) Neither SoftSolutions, Inc. nor BYU were parties to the agreement.
The 1994 Indemnification Agreement recognized that Tremco had separate claims
against BYU based upon Tremco's separate 1988 Agreement for the defective DSearch
technology: "Tremco has been involved in defending [claims for royalties by BYU] and
has, itself, asserted various claims against BYU as offsets or absolute defenses." (R. 522
(emphasis added).)
Tremco agreed only to indemnify S.T.C. for claims against S.T.C. Tremco never
agreed to assume any liability for claims against SoftSolutions, Inc. Recital C of the 1994
Indemnification Agreement stated its purpose was "to clarify the respective responsibilities
of the companies [Tremco and S.T.C.]" (R. 522 (emphasis added).) Further, Section 1 of
the agreement provided: "Tremco shall assume all costs and expenses of every nature,
including legal costs and expenses with respect to the current disputes with BYU and shall
indemnify and hold SoftSolutions [Technology Corporation] harmless from any and all
8

A copy of the 1994 Indemnification Agreement is found in the addendum at
Exhibit 5.
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claims, damages or liabilities of any nature." (R. 521-22 (emphasis added).)
BYU never commenced any proceedings against S.T.C. or WordPerfect nor obtained
any judgment against S.T.C. or WordPerfect regarding DSearch.
IV.

THE ARBITRATION BETWEEN BYU AND SOFTSOLUTIONS. INC. AND
CONFIRMATION PROCEEDINGS
The dispute that arose between SoftSolutions, Inc. and BYU concerned their

respective obligations under SoftSolutions, Inc.'s 1990 license Agreement. SoftSolutions,
Inc. believed that software products by other companies were using DSearch and infringing
upon BYU's patent exclusively licensed to SoftSolutions, Inc. SoftSolutions, Inc. requested
BYU to defend the patent against such infringement and withheld royalties otherwise due
pending such action by BYU. (R2000.51.) In addition, it was subsequently discovered that
the DSearch algorithm was flawed and, under the 1990 Agreement, such defective
technology would excuse SoftSolutions, Inc.'s obligations to pay royalties. (R2000. 50.)
In September 1995, an arbitration was held on BYU's and SoftSolutions, Inc.'s
dispute. (R2000. 52.) Only BYU and SoftSolutions, Inc. were parties to that arbitration.9
On July 3, 1996, the arbitrator issued his award in favor of BYU.

(R2000. 42.)

SoftSolutions, Inc. sought to vacate the award on the grounds the Arbitrator exceeded
powers under the arbitration agreement and based the award on matters not submitted to
him. (R. 650.) Judge Howard denied the motion to vacate and confirmed the award. This

9

It was stipulated to below that Tremco wrote the checks that paid the legal fees
incurred by SoftSolutions, Inc. in the arbitration. (R. 1031.) However, no evidence was
submitted as to the circumstances regarding such checks, including whether the checks
were issued pursuant to a loan or other arms-length transaction.
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Court affirmed Judge Howard's ruling that the arbitrator did not exceed his authority and
stated that Judge Howard properly applied the "'extremely narrow'" standard of review.
Hence, Judge Howard, and indeed this Court, did not render an independent judgment on
the merits of the arbitrator's decision . (R. 650. (SoftSolutions, Inc. v. Brigham Young
Univ.. 2000 UT 46, ^|10, 1 P.3d 1095).)
V.

BYU'S CLAIMS AGAINST TREMCO
B YU instituted this action to enforce the arbitration award against Tremco, asserting

six theories. (R2000. 1-96.) First, BYU alleged Tremco was liable to pay the judgment
against SoftSolutions, Inc. because, in the 1994 Indemnification Agreement, Tremco agreed
to indemnify S.T.C. regarding DSearch royalties. (R2000. 86-88.) Second, BYU alleged
that SoftSolutions, Inc. carried on business after its 1992 dissolution by participating in the
arbitration and confirmation proceedings, thereby becoming an unincorporated association,
which BYU labeled "SoftSolutions Association." As a result, BYU alleged, under Rule
17(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, all property owned jointly by the "SoftSolutions
Association" may be used to satisfy the judgment against SoftSolutions, Inc. (R2000. 8586.) Third, BYU alleged that Tremco received assets of SoftSolutions, Inc. during
SoftSolutions, Inc.' s dissolution and, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1408, BYU was
entitled to assert a claim against Tremco. Fourth, BYU alleged that the "SoftSolutions
Association" was a partnership and, as a partner, Tremco was jointly and severally liable for
the partnership's debts under Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-12. (R2000. 84-85.) BYU's fifth
theory was that it owned a resulting trust, constructive trust or equitable lien on all property
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Tremco received from SoftSolutions, Inc. (R2000. 83-84.) Finally, BYU asserted a
fraudulent transfer claim, alleging the dissolution of SoftSolutions, Inc. effected a fraudulent
transfer of SoftSolutions, Inc.'s property to Tremco and seeking an avoidance of such
transfers to Tremco. (R2000. 80-83.)
Tremco denied BYU's allegations. Tremco also filed a counterclaim based upon its
license agreements to the DSearch algorithm, separate from the 1990 license agreement
SoftSolutions, Inc. had with BYU. (R2000. 308-37.)
BYU moved the district court to consolidate the action it brought against Tremco
with the prior action against SoftSolutions, Inc., in which afinaljudgment had already been
rendered. (R2000. 102-04.) Over Tremco's objection, the district court consolidated the
cases. (R2000. 383-86.)
VI.

CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
BYU then moved to dismiss Tremco's counterclaim. Because BYU's motion relied

on two exhibits outside the pleadings, Tremco treated the motion as one for summary
judgment and opposed the motion. (R. 677-743.)
Tremco argued it was entitled to summary judgment because the undisputed material
facts demonstrated there was no legal basis on which BYU could recover against Tremco.
In particular, Tremco argued: (1) Tremco could not be held liable for the judgment against
SoftSolutions, Inc. because Tremco is a separate corporation from SoftSolutions, Inc. and
has not operated as SoftSolutions, Inc.'s alter ego10; (2) Tremco cannot be held liable for the
10

In its Complaint, BYU, in fact, made no allegation of alter ego to justify piercing
the two corporate veils of SoftSolutions, Inc. and Tremco.
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judgment

against

SoftSolutions,

Inc. because Tremco never

formed

a joint

venture/partnership with SoftSolutions, Inc. and was not otherwise part of any
"SoftSolutions Association"; (3) Tremco cannot be held liable for BYU's judgment against
SoftSolutions, Inc. based upon an indemnification agreement between Tremco and S.T.C.
because BYU was not a third-party beneficiary under the S.T.C. agreement and because the
agreement indemnified only S.T.C, not SoftSolutions, Inc.; and (4) Tremco is not liable for
a return of SoftSolutions, Inc.'s assets received on SoftSolutions, Inc.'s liquidation or
through a fraudulent transfer because Tremco received no assets from SoftSolutions, Inc.
and was not a shareholder of SoftSolutions, Inc. (R. 677-743.) In support of its motion and
opposing BYU's motion Tremco submitted the Duncan Affidavit. (R. 744-831.)
BYU opposed Tremco's motion for summary judgment and moved to strike the
Duncan Affidavit and requested discovery regarding the Duncan Affidavit under Rule 56(f).
(R. 889-898.)
At that time, BYU also submitted a Motion for Declaratory Relief and Partial
Summary Judgment seeking the following declarations: (1) that the indemnification
agreement Tremco entered with S.T.C. before the arbitration, is an admission that Tremco
was involved in SoftSolutions, Inc.'s defense in the arbitration, even though the arbitration
was not held until more than one year after the execution of the indemnification agreement;
and (2) that Tremco's agreement to indemnify S.T.C. means that Tremco agreed to be
responsible for indebtedness of SoftSolutions, Inc. to BYU.
BYU's motion sought partial summary judgment on the following points: (1) that
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Tremco was a privy of SoftSolutions, Inc. during the arbitration and therefore bound by the
judgment against SoftSolutions, Inc.; (2) that BYU is a third-party creditor beneficiary of
Tremco's indemnification agreement with S.T.C.; (3) that the sale of S.T.C. stock by
S.T.C.'s shareholders (none of whom were SoftSolutions, Inc.) to WordPerfect constituted
a distribution of SoftSolutions, Inc. assets on liquidation before payment of BYU's claim
against SoftSolutions, Inc., and therefore the S.T.C. shareholders1 ] are liable to BYU for the
judgment against SoftSolutions, Inc. to the extent of the proceeds they received from the sale
of S.T.C. stock; (4) that the judgment against SoftSolutions, Inc. is binding on all property
of SoftSolutions, Inc., or the proceeds from the sale of such property, pursuant to Rule 17(d)
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; (5) that a DSearch license assignment from
SoftSolutions, Inc. to S.T.C. long before the arbitration constituted a fraudulent transfer and
therefore BYU may execute the judgment against SoftSolutions, Inc. on any proceeds a
S.T.C. shareholder received for selling their S.T.C. stock. (R. 853-81.)
BYU submitted no depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, or affidavits
in support of its Motion for Declaratory Relief and Partial Summary Judgment. (R. 853-81.)
BYU served all moving papers only on counsel for Tremco. BYU never served its
papers on counsel of record for SoftSolutions, Inc. or upon third parties Duncan, et al. (R.
488,655,835, 846, 853, 882, 889,894,957,986-995.) Tremco opposed BYU's Motion for
Declaratory Relief and Partial Summary Judgment and supported its opposition with the
previously submitted Duncan Affidavit. (R. 899-932.)
n

No S.T.C. shareholder was ever made a party to the arbitration and confirmation
between BYU and SoftSolutions, Inc., or to the action between BYU and Tremco.
20

On April 10,2002, the district court, Judge Howard, heard argument on the various
motions. (R. 1033.) Only counsel for Tremco and SoftSolutions, Inc. were provided notice
or attended that hearing. (R. 1008,1033.) On May 14,2002, Judge Howard announced his
ruling and, on June 13,2002, entered a Judgment upon his ruling, which he certified as final
pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 1034-52, 1053-57.) By
that Judgment, the district court (1) granted BYU's motion for summary judgment and
declaratory relief, declaring that B YU was a third-party beneficiary of the contract between
Tremco and S.T.C., and that Tremco was a privy to the arbitration between BYU and
SoftSolutions, Inc. and therefore liable to pay the judgment against SoftSolutions, Inc.; (2)
granted BYU's motion to dismiss Tremco's counterclaim; (3) denied Tremco's motion for
summary judgment; and (4) granted BYU's motion to strike the affidavit of Kenneth W.
Duncan. (R. 1053-57.)
VI.

POST-JUDGMENT PROCEEDINGS
On June 26, 2002, after entry of the June 13, 2002 Judgment, BYU filed with the

district court a document entitled "BYU's Supplemental Exhibits L and M" ("Supplemental
Exhibits"), by which BYU sought to add exhibits to its earlier moving papers that were
resolved by the May 14, 2002 Ruling and June 13,2002 Judgment. (R. 1063-82.) On that
date BYU also submitted to Judge Howard (but apparently did not file) two documents: one
entitled "Application to Submit Supplemental Exhibits L and M and Order" ("Motion for
Exhibits Order") and another entitled "Supplemental Order" (referred to herein with regard
to the date entered as "July 10, 2002 Order"). According to their certificates of service,
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BYU served all three documents upon Tremco by mail on June 24, 2002. (R. 1080, 1158,
1192.) BYU did not serve the three documents on counsel for SoftSolutions, Inc. or on
Duncan, et al.
The Motion for Exhibits Order requested the District Court to enter the included
proposed order which would grant BYU leave to submit the Supplemental Exhibits. (R.
1136-38.)

Regarding the proposed July 10, 2002 Order, however, there was no

accompanying motion or memorandum of points and authorities. The proposed July 10,
2002 Order purported to make findings based on the statements of fact in BYU's motions
against Tremco and the May 14,2002 Ruling. It also purported to hold Duncan, et al. liable
to pay the 1998 Judgment against SoftSolutions, Inc. and the new Judgment against Tremco,
even though these third-party individuals and corporate entities were never joined in the
action between BYU and SoftSolutions, Inc., or in the action between BYU and Tremco.
(R. 1139-51.) That Order provided that the statements of fact in BYU's motions against
Tremco were deemed admitted by Duncan, et al. and SoftSolutions, Inc. because they did
not submit opposing memoranda, even though BYU never served its moving papers upon
Duncan, et al. or SoftSolutions, Inc. (R. 1149-50.)
On July 3, 2002, before the Court acted on BYU's June 26, 2002 filings, Tremco
filed its Notice of Appeal from the entire judgment. On July 5,2002, Tremco moved to stay
all enforcement pending resolution of its appeal. (R. 1099-1101, 1117-19.) Even though
the case was appealed and Tremco had moved to stay execution, Judge Howard, on July 10,
2002, signed and entered the order granting BYU leave to submit the Supplemental Exhibits
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and also signed and entered the July 10,2002 Order.12 (R. 1127,41.) The next day, July 11,
2002, Tremco filed its opposition to the Supplemental Exhibits and the July 10,2002 Order
and also moved to vacate the orders.
On July 15,2002, SoftSolutions, Inc. and Duncan, et al. each filed their own notices
of appeal. (R. 1411-15.) Thereafter, on July 25, 2002, SoftSolutions, Inc. and Duncan, et
al. each moved to vacate the July 10,2002 Order, and Duncan et al. moved to intervene. (R.
1467-75, 1478-1514.)13
The district court has not yet ruled on any of the motions filed related to the
Supplemental Exhibits and July 10, 2002 Order. On June 3, 2003, Judge Gary D. Stott
(assigned to the case below in April 2003) scheduled oral argument to be held July 22,2002
(the day after this Brief is to be filed).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This Court should reverse the summary judgment against Tremco because it violates
Tremco's right to due process of law and effectively repeals the corporate limited liability
recognized by the Utah Legislature and vital to economic development in the State of Utah.
Without pleading or proving any claim for alter ego liability, Tremco was held liable below
to pay a judgment confirming an arbitration award rendered against a different corporation,

12

This was before expiration of the time afforded Tremco to oppose BYU's
papers. Because service was by mail, Tremco had until July 12, 2002 to oppose BYU's
papers (July 9 is ten business days after June 24, plus three days for service by mail). See
Utah R. Jud. Admin. 4-501(B); Utah R. Civ. P. 6(e).
13

Tremco filed a second Notice of Appeal on August 9, 2002. (R. 1785-87.) That
second appeal was consolidated into the first.
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even though Tremco was not a party to the arbitration agreement, Tremco was not a party
to the arbitration, Tremco was not named as a party to the confirmation proceedings, and
Tremco was never served with process in that action.
The theories B YU advanced below to circumvent the requirements of due process are
squarely refuted by governing Utah law. First, BYU's theory that Tremco is liable to pay
the judgment to which it was not a party under Rule 17(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
is refuted by the very language of that Rule. Rule 17(d) is merely a procedural rule for
bringing an action against a partnership or association. Application of the rule requires,
first, that a partnership or association actually exist, whereas in this case, there was no ruling
that a partnership existed, and the undisputed facts rebutted the existence of a partnership
or association. Moreover, even assuming there was an association or partnership between
SoftSolutions, Inc. and Tremco, Tremco cannot be held liable under Rule 17(d) to pay the
1998 Judgment because that Judgment was rendered only against one member of the
association, SoftSolutions, Inc., and not against the association itself.
Second, res judicata does not render Tremco liable to pay the judgment entered
against SoftSolutions, Inc., because res judicata only precludes relitigation of certain claims
or issues. Res judicata is not a mechanism for affirmative relief by which one corporation
can be held vicariously liable to pay a judgment rendered against a different corporation.
Third, Tremco clearly cannot be held liable pursuant to BYU's claims based upon a
return of assets Tremco allegedly received from SoftSolutions, Inc., including under BYU's
constructive trust and fraudulent transfer theories and under Utah Code Ann. § 16-1 Oa-1408,
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which allows enforcement of a claim of a corporation's creditor against a shareholder
receiving assets in liquidation of that corporation. The record is clear that Tremco received
no assets from SoftSolutions, Inc.
Third, the 1994 Indemnification Agreement does not make Tremco liable to pay the
judgment against a SoftSolutions, Inc. That agreement was entered into only between
Tremco and S.T.C., not SoftSolutions, Inc., and Tremco only agreed to indemnify S.T.C.
Moreover, B YU was not a party to that agreement and has no right to enforce that agreement
because the parties clearly intended to not confer any benefit upon BYU.
This Court should likewise vacate the July 10,2002 Order. That Order was rendered
without due process because it makes Duncan, et al. liable to pay the judgments against
SoftSolutions, Inc. and Tremco, even though Duncan, et al. have never been named as party
defendants in a complaint by BYU, have never been served a summons with such a
complaint, were not served BYU's moving papers that resulted in the July 10, 2002 Order,
and were not even served the July 10, 2002 Order in its proposed form.
Moreover, the Court should vacate the July 10, 2002 Order because it was rendered
without subject matter jurisdiction. Before the July 10, 2002 Order was entered, Tremco
filed its notice of appeal from the entire June 13, 2002 Judgment, including the underlying
May 14, 2002 Ruling, thereby divesting the district court of jurisdiction to modify in any
way the May 14. 2002 Ruling or June 13, 2002 Judgment. Notwithstanding, the July 10,
2002 Order purports to modify both the May 14, 2002 Ruling and the June 13, 2002
Judgment. As a result, that Order is absolutely void.

25

In addition, the July 10, 2002 Order should be reversed because it is based upon a
ruling that is plainly wrong. That Order purports to permit BYU to execute on proceeds
from a sale of stock in S.T.C. that Judge Howard ruled to be a fraudulent transfer of S.T.C.'s
assets. However, the sale was a stock sale, not an asset sale, and therefore no assets of
S.T.C. were transferred thereby, fraudulently or otherwise.
Finally, the Court should reverse Judge Howard's exclusion of the Duncan Affidavit
in its entirety. The Affidavit was not inadmissible under "law of the case" as a result of
portions of it allegedly contradicting the arbitrator's ruling. The arbitration proceeding was
a separate proceeding, and consolidation of the 2000 Case into the 1996 Case cannot affect
Tremco's substantive rights. Further, the Affidavit was admissible notwithstanding the parol
evidence rule because it was not submitted for the purpose of altering the terms of any
agreement, was based upon personal knowledge of the officer of a corporation making
statements regarding the corporation, and did not contain inadmissible legal conclusions by
merely setting forth facts that touched upon legal issues.
ARGUMENT
I.

REQUIRING TREMCO TO PAY THE JUDGMENT AGAINST
SOFTSOLUTIONS, INC. VIOLATES TREMCO'S RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS OF LAW UNDER THE UTAH AND UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTIONS.
First and foremost, making Tremco liable to pay the judgment against a different

entity, SoftSolutions, Inc., violates Tremco's right to due process of law under the Utah and
United States Constitutions.
The record is clear that Tremco was not a party to the 1990 Agreement containing the
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arbitration clause, was not a party to the arbitration between BYU and SoftSolutions, Inc.,
and was not named as a party to or served any summons in the litigation confirming the
Arbitration Award. As a result, it is a violation of Tremco's right to due process of law to
force Tremco to pay the SoftSolutions, Inc. judgment. This is made clear by the United
States Supreme Court decision in Zenith Radio. As the Court explained:
It is elementary that one is not bound by a judgment in personam resulting
from litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to which he has
not been made a party by service of process. The consistent constitutional
rule has been that a court has no power to adjudicate a personal claim or
obligation unless it has jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.. 395 U.S. 100,110 (1960) (emphasis added).
Due process is not satisfied merely because Tremco had officers/directors in common
with SoftSolutions, Inc. In Zenith Radio, the United States Supreme Court squarely held
that even a parent corporation's due process rights were violated when a judgment against
its subsidiary was applied against it, even after the subsidiary stipulated to the parent being
treated the same as the subsidiary for purposes of the litigation. Id.
Fundamentally, the right to due process under both article I, section 7 of the Utah
Constitution and Amendment XIV of the United States Constitution requires timely and
adequate notice that a particular issue will be heard and a right to a full and fair opportunity
to be heard by the court on the issue. Plumb v. State. 809 P.2d 734, 743 (Utah 1990);
Nelson v.Jacobsen. 669 P.2d 1207,1212-13 (Utah 1983); Cornish Town v. Roller, 798 P.2d
753, 756 (Utah 1990); Penn v. San Juan Hosp. Inc.. 528 F.2d 1181, 1186 (10th Cir. 1975).
Tremco never received the constitutionally required notice that it could be held personally
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liable to pay the SoftSolutions, Inc. judgment before that judgment was entered. As a result,
holding Tremco to pay that judgment deprives Tremco of its property without due process.
II.

THE COURT SHOULD REJECT JUDGE HOWARD'S RULING BECAUSE
IT REPEALS LIMITED CORPORATE LIABILITY AS RECOGNIZED BY
THE LEGISLATURE.
By holding Tremco liable to pay the judgment against the different corporation,

SoftSolutions, Inc., without BYU pleading or proving alter ego liability to pierce both
SoftSolutions, Inc.'s and Tremco's corporate veils, based only on a commonality of officers
and shareholders, Judge Howard has eviscerated fundamental principles of corporate law
regarding separate corporations and limited corporate liability.
The undisputed facts conclusively established that Tremco was a different corporation
than both SoftSolutions, Inc. and S.T.C., and, therefore, cannot be held liable for the
judgment rendered against only SoftSolutions, Inc. "[A] corporation is entitled to a
presumption of separateness from a sister corporation even if both are controlled by the same
individuals." Cade v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 956 P.2d 1073 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). It is
axiomatic that a corporation is liable only for its own debts.
This Court has made it clear that under Utah law "a corporation is regarded as a legal
entity, separate and apart from its stockholders." Dockstader v. Walker, 510 P.2d 526, 528
(Utah 1973); accord Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d42,46(Utah
Ct. App. 1988). "The purpose of such separation is to insulate the stockholders from the
liabilities of the corporation, thus limiting their liability to only the amount that the
stockholders voluntarily put at risk." James Constructors, 761 P.2d at 46. Accordingly, the
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Utah Legislature has established that "a shareholder or subscriber for shares of a corporation
is not personally liable for the acts or debts of the corporation solely by reason of the
ownership of the corporation's shares." Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-622(2) (2001).
Limited corporate liability is vital to Utah's economy because it
promote[s] commerce and industrial growth by encouraging shareholders to
make capital contributions to corporations without subjecting all of their
personal wealth to the risks of the business. This incentive to business
investment has been called the most important legal development of the
nineteenth century.
David H. Barber, Piercing the Corporate Veil, 17 Willamette L. Rev. 371, 371-72 (1981);
accord James Constructors, 761 P.2d at 46 n.9. If one person investing in more than one
corporation at a time could make each corporation jointly and severally liable for the other
corporation's debts, then investors would have no ability to diversify their portfolios and
capital investment would be greatly discouraged, removing capital necessary to fuel
marketplace development. The impact of such liability would be just as if an investor placed
all their personal assets at risk by purchasing stock in a corporation. "In fact, limited liability
is one of the principal purposes for which the law has created the corporation." 1 Fletcher
Cyclopedia of the law of Private Corporations § 41.20, at 596-97 (1999); accord 18 CJ.S.
Corporations § 16 (1990) ("The law permits the incorporation of a business for the very
purpose of escaping personal liability . . . ."); Barber, supra, at 373 ("[C]ourts of every
jurisdiction have recognized the legitimacy of incorporating to avoid personal liability.").
Under the fundamental corporate law principle of corporate separateness and limited
liability, Tremco cannot be held liable for the judgment entered against SoftSolutions, Inc.
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III.

TREMCO CANNOT BE HELD LIABLE FOR THE SOFTSOLUTIONS, INC.
JUDGMENT UNDER RULE 17(d) BECAUSE RULE 17(d), BY ITS TERMS,
DOES NOT APPLY.
A.

BECAUSE
THERE
WAS
NO
PARTNERSHIP
OR
UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATION BETWEEN TREMCO AND
SOFTSOLUTIONS, INC., RULE 17(d) DOES NOT MAKE TREMCO
LIABLE TO PAY THE JUDGMENT AGAINST SOFTSOLUTIONS,
INC.

Judge Howard's Judgment cannot be supported by Rule 17(d), first, because there
was no partnership14 or unincorporated association between SoftSolutions, Inc. and Tremco.
This Court construes the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure according to their plain terms.
First Equity Fed.. Inc. v. Phillips Dev. L C 2002 UT 56, ^|16, 52 P.3d 1157. By its plain
terms, Rule 17(d) applies only when there is already in existence an entity, whether a
partnership as defined in the Utah Code or a group of individuals "associated" together to
carry on business without a corporate charter:
When two or more persons associated in any business either as a jointstock company, a partnership or other association, not a corporation,
transact such business under a common name, whether it comprises the
names of such associates or not, they may sue or be sued by such common
name.
Utah R. Civ. P. 17(d) (emphasis added). By beginning with "When," listing three factual
conditions — (1) two or more persons associated and (2) transacting business (3) under a
common name — and then providing "may sue or be sued by such common name," Rule
,4

As defined in the Utah Code, the sole difference between a partnership and joint
venture is that a joint venture carries on a single business enterprise while a partnership's
business is continuing. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 48-l-3(l)(a) (1998) with id. § 48-13.1(1). Because such distinction is irrelevant here, Tremco's references herein to one
also encompass the other. See Kemp v. Murray, 680 P.2d 758, 759 (Utah 1984) ("A
joint venture is subject to the same rules as a partnership.").
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17(d)'s authorization to be sued is clearly contingent upon satisfaction of those three
conditions. In this case, Rule 17(d) is inapplicable because there was neither a partnership
nor an unincorporated association carrying on business.
1.

THERE WAS NO PARTNERSHIP.

Tremco cannot be held liable for the judgment against SoftSolutions, Inc. because
there was no partnership between the two corporations. Judge Howard never ruled there
was a partnership,15 the undisputed facts rebutted the existence of a partnership, and B YU
provided no evidence meeting its burden to prove the necessary elements of a partnership.
(R. 1034-52.)
BYU bore the burden of proving the existence of a partnership. Stone v. First Wyo.
Bank N.A.. 625 F.2d 332, 341 n.12 (10th Cir. 1980); 46 Am. Jur. 2d. Joint Ventures § 76
(1994) ("The existence of a joint venture is never presumed."). Further, because Tremco
submitted evidence rebutting any partnership, BYU bore the burden of producing evidence
to resist summary judgment. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e); Thayne v. Beneficial Utah, Inc., 874
P.2d 120, 124-25 (Utah 1994) (affirming summary judgment for defendant when plaintiff
failed to produce evidence placing a material fact at issue). BYU met neither burden.
A partnership is defined as "an association of two or more persons to carry on as coowners a business for profit." Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-3 (2002). This Court has held a
partnership is a voluntary agreement. Harline v. Campbell 728 P.2d 980,982 (Utah 1986);

15

BYU alleged Tremco was liable to pay the SoftSolutions, Inc. Judgment because
there was a partnership between SoftSolutions, Inc. and Tremco (R2000. 84, 94), and
argued that claim in opposing Tremco's summary judgment motion. (R. 863.)
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see also 46 Am. Jur. 2d. Joint Ventures § 11 (1994) ("A joint venture can exist only by
voluntary agreement of the parties, and cannot arise by operation of law."). A partnership
must be demonstrated by certain essential elements:
"the parties must combine their property, money, effects, skill, labor and
knowledge. As a general rule, there must be a community of interest in the
performance of the common purpose, a joint proprietary interest in the subject
matter, a mutual right to control, a right to share in the profits, and unless there
is an agreement to the contrary, a duty to share in any losses which may be
sustained."
Rogers v. M.O. Bitner Co.. 73 8 P.2d 1029,1032 (Utah 1987) (citation omitted). BYU failed
to plead or present evidence on these essential elements, see 46 Am. Jur. 2d. Joint Ventures
§ 72 (1994) ("A complaint in an action arising out of a joint venture must allege all of the
elements of a joint venture . . . . " ) , and the undisputed facts rebutted them.
First, there was no common name. In the late 1980fs, Tremco did business as
"SoftSolutions Legal Solutions," but relinquished the name "SoftSolutions" to KAL, Inc.,
which later became SoftSolutions, Inc. Second, SoftSolutions, Inc. and Tremco had no
common purpose. Tremco sold legal time and billing software for mini-computers to law
firms and law departments whereas SoftSolutions, Inc. assigned its license to S.T.C. to
distribute different personal computer-based software on local area networks in a variety of
markets. Third, there was no joint proprietary interest. Neither Tremco nor SoftSolutions,
Inc. were shareholders of each other and BYU granted separate licenses to SoftSolutions,
Inc. and Tremco that were used for each company's distinct products sold in different
markets. Finally, there was no right or duty to share in profits and losses. SoftSolutions,
Inc. had no right to Tremco's profits, Tremco had no right to SoftSolutions, Inc.'s profits,
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and there was no third entity called "SoftSolutions Association" whose profits/losses were
shared. There simply was no agreement or combination of money or property in pursuit of
a common purpose.
The only fact in the record argued by BYU to support the existence of a partnership
between SoftSolutions, Inc. and Tremco at the time the 1990 Agreement was entered is the
commonality of officers and directors between, SoftSolutions, Inc. and Tremco. As a matter
of law, commonality of officers is not enough:
Merely because the partnerships maintained business relationships with each
other is not necessarily conclusive . . . of the existence of a joint venture, so
long as the business transactions were conducted on an arms-length basis.
Likewise, the existence of some overlapping activities and resources
among the partnerships, such as the use of a shared employee and of the
same accountant, is not controlling on the issue of the joint venture's
existence.
Stone, 625 F.2d at 341 (emphasis added).
Consequently, whether labeled as "SoftSolutions Association" or otherwise, because
the undisputed facts showed that there was no partnership between SoftSolutions, Inc. and
Tremco, Tremco cannot be held liable under Rule 17(d) for the judgment against
SoftSolutions, Inc.
2.

THERE WAS NO UNINCORPORATED
CARRYING ON BUSINESS.

ASSOCIATION

In addition to there being no partnership, Tremco was not transacting business as part
of an association with SoftSolutions, Inc. or S.T.C.
First, the concept of an unincorporated association has absolutely no application in
this case. Tremco, SoftSolutions, Inc., and S.T.C. were each incorporated with the state of
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Utah and each carried on its business for profit.

An unincorporated association, in

distinction, is a group of two or more persons associating for a common purpose without
a corporate charter. See 7 C.J.S. Associations § 3.a (1980) (stating "the term 'association'
is generally used in a restricted sense as relating to unincorporated societies, and the
individuals composing an association act by virtue of a mere agency, while a corporation
acts in its own person") (footnotes omitted).
Further, because Tremco, SoftSolutions, Inc., and S.T.C. were each formed for
commercial purposes, their liability vis a vis one another and to BYU must be measured
under the law of partnerships. Typically an unincorporated association is formed for a
public, charitable, or political interest shared by its members. See Graham v. Davis County
Solid Waste, 1999 UT App 136, Tfl 1, 979 P.2d 363 (noting as examples of unincorporated
associations, "'social clubs, religious organizations, environmental societies, athletic
organizations, condominium owners, lodges, stock exchanges and veterans'"") (citation and
emphasis omitted). When persons come together for commercial purposes, partnership law
applies. As C.J.S. explains:
[W]here the association is organized for commercial purposes, and
operated for pecuniary profit, it is no more than a partnership, and the
rights and liabilities incident to that relation attach to its members, as well
between the members themselves, as between a member and the association,
and as between members and third persons dealing with them or the
association.
7 C.J.S. Associations § 3.b (1980) (emphasis added); see 6 Am. Jur. 2d Associations &
Clubs § 2 (2d ed 1999) ("When a voluntary association is organized for profit, the members
of the association are treated as partners.") (emphasis added).
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Second, there is no association because Tremco, SoftSolutions, Inc., and S.T.C., have
not been transacting business together in a common name. As demonstrated above
regarding the absence of a partnership, Tremco was engaged in a wholly different business
than SoftSolutions, Inc. and S.T.C.: selling different software products to different markets.
The only conduct B YU argued with regard to any common purpose was related to the
arbitration and the confirmation litigation. BYU never provided any authority, and Tremco
has found none, supporting the proposition that participation in litigation can make one
legally recognized entity liable to pay a judgment rendered in an action to which it was not
a named and served party. No doubt that is because such a position is contrary to law. See
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research. Inc.. 395 U.S. 100, 110 (1960).
Indeed, BYU's theory would eviscerate case law governing when a corporate veil
may be pierced. Rather than being held liable only after proper pleading and proof of alter
ego liability, under BYU's theory, any officer, shareholder, affiliated corporation, subsidiary
corporation, parent corporation, or creditor that participates or aides a corporation's defense
in litigation in any way would automatically become personally liable for any judgment
rendered against that corporation by virtue of inadvertently creating an "unincorporated
association" for purposes of that litigation. This is not and cannot be the law.
Moreover, Utah law squarely contradicts Judge Howard's Ruling that an
unincorporated association was created as a result of SoftSolutions, Inc.'s 1992 dissolution
and later participation in the arbitration and confirmation litigation. SoftSolutions, Inc.'s
participation in the arbitration and the confirmation proceedings does not constitute the
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carrying on of business because it is explicitly authorized by the Utah Code. The Utah
Code states: "A dissolved corporation continues its corporate existence but may not carry
on any business except that appropriate to wind up and liquidate its business and
affairs...." Utah Code Ann. § 16- 10a-1405(1) (2001) (emphasis added). The Utah Code
further states: "Dissolution of a corporation does n o t . . . (e) prevent commencement of a
proceeding by or against the corporation in its corporate name." Id. § 16-10a-1405(2)
(emphasis added); accord Arndt v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, N.A., 1999 UT 91, f 14,
991 P.2d 584 (holding that corporate principles of "winding down" apply in the context of
limited partnerships and that, like a corporation, a partnership retains the ability to sue and
be sued after dissolution).
Accordingly, because the undisputed facts demonstrate there was no partnership or
unincorporated association, Tremco cannot be held liable pursuant to Rule 17(d). This
Court should reverse the judgment against Tremco and remand for entry of summary
judgment in favor of Tremco on BYU's claims.
B.

TREMCO CANNOT BE HELD LIABLE UNDER RULE 17(d)
BECAUSE THE SOFTSOLUTIONS, INC. JUDGMENT WAS
RENDERED ONLY AGAINST SOFTSOLUTIONS, INC. AND NOT
AGAINST THE ALLEGED PARTNERSHIP/UNINCORPORATED
ASSOCIATION.

Even assuming there was an unincorporated association or partnership between
SoftSolutions, Inc., Tremco, and S.T.C., as Judge Howard ruled, Tremco still cannot be held
liable under Rule 17(d) to pay the judgment against SoftSolutions, Inc. because that
judgment was obtained against SoftSolutions, Inc. individually and upon the individual
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debt of SoftSolutions, Inc. and not against the alleged association.16
First, the 1990 Agreement and the Judgment represent debts solely of SoftSolutions,
Inc. SoftSolutions, Inc. entered the agreement in its own name, before it was dissolved,
only SoftSolutions, Inc. was a party to the arbitration, and the 1998 Judgment was expressly
entered only against "SoftSolutions, Inc."

Even if there was an unincorporated

association/partnership between SoftSolutions, Inc. and Tremco, the 1998 Judgment is not
a debt of that partnership. 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 190.b (1998) ("If one partner makes a
contract in his or her own name and the transaction, as far as the plaintiff knows, is with that
partner alone, as a general rule the contracting partner alone may be sued."); cf Kemp v.
Murray, 680 P.2d 758, 760 (Utah 1984) (holding an action on a partnership debt must be
brought in the name of either all partners or the partnership as the real, indispensable party
in interest); Searle Bros, v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 691 (Utah 1978) (holding a judgment
against a partner in his individual capacity does not bind the partnership under collateral
estoppel). Because the SoftSolutions, Inc. judgment is not a partnership debt, the alleged
partners cannot be held liable. See Utah Code Ann. § 48-l-12(l)(b) (2002) (providing
partners are liable "jointly for all.. . debts and obligations of the partnership").
Moreover, Rule 17(d) expressly provides that for a judgment to bind the individual
property of a member of an unincorporated association, either the association itself or that
individual member must be a named and served party. Rule 17(d) provides in relevant part:
Any judgment obtained against the association shall bind the joint property
16

Tremco refers in this section of its Argument to a partnership and an
unincorporated association interchangeably because this point applies equally to both.
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of all the associates in the same manner as if all had been named parties and
had been sued upon their joint liability. The separate property of an
individual member of the association may not be bound by the judgment
unless the member is named as a party and the court acquires
jurisdiction over the member.
Utah R. Civ. P. 17(d) (emphasis added). Neither Tremco nor the alleged association
between SoftSolutions, Inc., Tremco, and S.T.C. were parties to the arbitration or named or
served with process in the confirmation proceedings. That fact, and that fact alone, is wholly
dispositive of any claim by B YU to enforce the SoftSolutions, Inc. Judgment against Tremco
under Rule 17(d).
Finally, even if the 1998 Judgment was entered against the alleged unincorporated
association, which it was not, Tremco cannot be made to pay that judgment because it would
bind only property owned by the association and not the property owned individually by the
association members. Rule 17(d) explicitly states that a judgment against an association
"shall bind the joint property of all the associates." The undisputed facts below
demonstrated Tremco held no property jointly with SoftSolutions, Inc.
IV.

RES JUDICATA DOES NOT RENDER TREMCO LIABLE TO PAY THE
SOFTSOLUTIONS, INC. JUDGMENT BECAUSE RES JUDICATA IS A
DEFENSE THAT PRECLUDES RELITIGATION OF CLAIMS AND
ISSUES: RES JUDICATA IS NOT A MECHANISM FOR AFFIRMATIVE
RELIEF.
The Court should reverse the judgment against Tremco because it is based upon a

distortion of the doctrine of res judicata. The district court transformed the doctrine from
one merely precluding relitigation of claims or issues into a means to affirmatively require
the precluded person to pay the prior judgment.
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Res Judicata embodies both claim and issue preclusion. In re General Determination
of the Rights to the Use of All the Water. 1999 UT 39, ^16, HI 8, 982 P.2d 65. Claim and
issue preclusion are affirmative defenses that only bar relitigation of claims and issues.
Hence, even if Judge Howard ruled correctly that claim or issue preclusion apply, he
fundamentally misapplied the effect of that ruling by holding Tremco liable to pay the
Judgment against SoftSolutions, Inc.
This Court has repeatedly stated that "'"claim preclusion bars a party from
prosecuting in a subsequent action a claim that has been fully litigated previously.""'
Snyder v. Murray City Corp.. 2003 UT 13, p 4 , 471 Utah Adv. Rep. 5 (citations omitted).
Likewise, issue preclusion ""'prevents parties or their privies from relitigating facts and
issues in the second suit that were fully litigated in the first suit.'"" Id. T|35. Accordingly,
if it applies, res judicata prevents Tremco from asserting certain claims or disputing certain
facts and issues. It does not require Tremco to pay the SoftSolutions, Inc. judgment.
The Restatement of Judgments expressly recognizes this distinction. It provides that
even where res judicata applies and binds a shareholder to an earlier action in which the
corporation was a party, the shareholder is not personally liable for that judgment unless
given prior notice of an alter ego claim and an opportunity in the original action to defend
it. Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 59(5).17 It is uncontroverted BYU never made or
pursued any alter ego claim in this action, the arbitration, or the confirmation proceedings.
,7

Section 59(5) states: "A judgment against a corporation that is found to be the
alter ego of a stockholder or member of the corporation establishes personal liability of
the latter only if he is given notice that such liability is sought to be imposed and fair
opportunity to defend the action resulting in the judgment." (Emphasis added.)
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As a result, Tremco cannot be held liable for the judgment against SoftSolutions, Inc.
V.

TREMCO IS ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON BYU'S CLAIMS
FOR RECOUPMENT OF SOFTSOLUTIONS, INC.'S ASSETS BECAUSE
TREMCO NEVER RECEIVED SOFTSOLUTIONS, INC.'S ASSETS.
Judge Howard clearly erred by failing to grant Tremco summary judgment on BYU's

claims for a return of SoftSolutions, Inc.'s assets. The undisputed facts established Tremco
received none of SoftSolutions, Inc.'s assets.18
In its Complaint, B YU asserted a claim against Tremco pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 16-10a-1408, which provides for enforcement of a claim by a dissolved corporation's
creditor "against a shareholder of the dissolved corporation, if the assets have been
distributed in liquidation." Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1408(2). (R2000. 84-85.) BYUalso
sought a return of assets allegedly wrongfully received by Tremco from SoftSolutions, Inc.
based upon a theory of "resulting trust, constructive trust/equitable lien" and based upon
BYUfs allegation that such transfers were fraudulent transfers under the Uniform Fraudulent
Transfer Act, Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-1 to -13 (1998 & Supp. 2002). (R2000. 80-84.)
BYU's claims fail as a matter of law. First, the undisputed facts demonstrated that
SoftSolutions, Inc. had no assets after its dissolution, and Tremco received no assets from
SoftSolutions, Inc. (R. 826.) Simply put, there was nothing to return and no transfers to
void as fraudulent.

Hence, BYU's claim under § 16-10a-1408 fails as a matter of law. That

,8

Indeed, although Tremco explicitly moved for judgment on BYU's multiple
claims seeking a return of assets Tremco received from SoftSolutions, Inc. and BYU
made no argument opposing summary judgment on those claims, Judge Howard made no
ruling on those claims at all, and instead simply cursorily denied Tremco's motion as a
whole. (R. 1041-1042.)
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statute states "a shareholder's total liability for all claims under this section may not exceed
the total value of assets distributed to him." Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1408(2) (emphasis
added).19 Likewise, it is obvious that if Tremco received no SoftSolutions, Inc. assets, there
was nothing fraudulently transferred by SoftSolutions, Inc. and nothing to return.
Accordingly, Judge Howard clearly erred in failing to grant Tremco summary
judgment on BYU's claims based upon a wrongful receipt of assets.
VI.

TREMCO'S 1994 INDEMNIFICATION AGREEMENT WITH S.T.C. DOES
NOT RENDER TREMCO LIABLE BECAUSE THAT AGREEMENT
OBLIGATED TREMCO TO INDEMNIFY ONLY S.T.C NOT
SOFTSOLUTIONS, INC., AND BYU CANNOT ENFORCE THAT
AGREEMENT.
Judge Howard erred in holding Tremco liable for the judgment against SoftSolutions,

Inc. based upon the 1994 Agreement. In that agreement, Tremco agreed to only indemnify
S.T.C, not SoftSolutions, Inc. Further, BYU cannot enforce the 1994 Agreement because
it was not a third-party beneficiary of the agreement.
A.

TREMCO AGREED TO INDEMNIFY ONLY S.T.C.

This Court construes unambiguous contracts according to their plain meaning.
Holmes Dev.. LLC v. Cook, 2002 UT 38, f24,48 P.3d 895. Here, the 1994 Indemnification
Agreement unambiguously shows Tremco agreed to only indemnify S.T.C, and not
SoftSolutions, Inc.
First, the 1994 Indemnification Agreement is unambiguous that it was entered into

19

Section 1408 was further inapplicable because Tremco was never a shareholder
of SoftSolutions, Inc. (R. 828.)
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only between Tremco and S.T.C. SoftSolutions, Inc. was not a party to that agreement.
The introductory paragraph reads: "THIS AGREEMENT is made and entered into as of this
10th day of January, 1994, by and between SOFTSOLUTIONS TECHNOLOGY
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation..., and TREMCO CONSULTANTS, INC., A Utah
corporation ("Tremco")."

(R. 522 (emphasis added).)

Further, the signature lines

unambiguously demonstrate the contract was signed by Kenneth W. Duncan as President
and CEO of "SOFTSOLUTIONS TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION, aUtah corporation."
(R. 521.) The body of that Agreement makes reference to "SoftSolutions" but the
introductory paragraph expressly defines that term to mean SoftSolutions Technology
Corporation, not SoftSolutions, Inc. (R. 522.)
Second, the 1994 Indemnification Agreement unambiguously defines exactly for
whom Tremco agreed to be liable: only SoftSolutions Technology Corporation. Recital C
states that the agreement is intended to "clarify the respective responsibilities of the
companies [i.e., Tremco and SoftSolutions Technology Corporation] with respect to the
BYU claims." (R. 522 (emphasis added).) Hence, the agreement was intended only to
govern liability between Tremco and SoftSolutions Technology Corporation, and not any
other entity, including SoftSolutions, Inc. Further, in Section 1 of the agreement, Tremco
explicitly agreed to indemnify only SoftSolutions Technology Corporation. That section
provides:
Tremco shall assume all costs and expenses of every nature, including legal
costs and expenses with respect to the current disputes with BYU and shall
20

A copy of the 1994 Indemnification Agreement is in the Addendum as Exhibit 5.
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indemnify and hold SoftSolutions [defined earlier as SoftSolutions
Technology Corporation] harmless from any and all claims, damages or
liabilities of any nature, including but not limited to costs and attorneys' fees,
stemming from or in connection with, BYU claims with respect to the
DSearch algorhythm [sic].
(R. 521.) Accordingly, because the 1998 Judgment was entered against SoftSolutions, Inc.
and not against SoftSolutions Technology Corporation, the Judgment is simply not a liability
covered by the 1994 Indemnification Agreement.
BYU has argued that pursuant to the first sentence in Section 1 of the agreement
Tremco agreed to be responsible for any and all claims BYU may have against any entity,
including SoftSolutions, Inc.21 However, that is a general sentence describing the type of
liability that might be incurred ("the defense and pursuit of claims") that is modified by the
specific limitations preceding and following it. When interpreting contracts, "specific terms
and exact terms are given greater weight than general language." Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 203(c) (1981); accord Wood v. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 2001 UT App 35,
^[7,19 P.3d 392. First, the preceding and specific Recital C states the agreement only affects
the "respective" rights and liabilities between Tremco and SoftSolutions Technology
Corporation. Second, the immediately following sentence, quoted above, defines exactly
who Tremco agreed to indemnify:

SoftSolutions Technology Corporation, and only

SoftSolutions Technology Corporation. Accordingly, the specific statements that Tremco
agreed to indemnify only S.T.C. govern over the general recitation of what that

21

That sentence provides: "Tremco consents and acknowledges that Tremco is the
responsible party with respect to the BYU claims and is solely responsible for the
defense and pursuit of claims with respect to that matter." (R. 522.)
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indemnification might entail.
Further, if the sentence could reasonably be interpreted to mean Tremco agreed to
indemnify every entity under the sun, the agreement is ambiguous because Tremco's reading
of the agreement is also reasonable. "A contract provision is ambiguous if it is capable of
more than one reasonable interpretation." Peterson v. Sunrider Corp., 2002 UT 43, ^[19,48
P.3d 918. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). When a contract is ambiguous
and there are issues of fact regarding the intent of the contracting parties, summary judgment
is inappropriate. Id. In that event, the Court looks to extrinsic evidence to determine if there
is an issue of fact as to the parties' intent behind the Indemnification Agreement. Id. Here,
the only extrinsic evidence submitted on this point was the Affidavit of Kenneth W. Duncan,
Tremco's officer and a former officer of S.T.C., which stated Tremco intended to indemnify
S.T.C., not SoftSolutions, Inc. (R. 826.) Hence, even if both readings are reasonable,
summary judgment was still appropriate for Tremco because BYU provided no evidence
countering the Duncan Affidavit and that affidavit supports Tremco's view, and BYU
thereby failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Even without the Duncan Affidavit,
summary judgment in BYU's favor was incorrect because, at best for BYUfs position, the
contract was ambiguous.
B.

BYU IS NOT A THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARY OF THE 1994
INDEMNIFICATION AGREEMENT.

Judge Howard further erred in holding that the 1994 Indemnification Agreement
rendered Tremco liable to pay the 1998 Judgment against SoftSolutions, Inc. because BYU
was not a third-party beneficiary of that agreement. A third party has no enforceable rights
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under a contract unless he is an intended beneficiary. See Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt
Paving. Inc. v. Blomquist 773 P.2d 1382,1386 (Utah 1989). To be an intended beneficiary
"[t]he intent of the contracting parties to confer a separate and distinct benefit must be
clear/' Id.; seeOxendine v. Overturf 1999UT4,^14,973 P.2d417. Moreover/"[a] third
party who benefits only incidentally from the performance of a contract has no right to
recover under that contract/" Millerv.Martineau&Co.. 1999 UTApp 216,^37,983 P.2d
1107 (citation omitted); accord Broadwater v. Old Republic Sur., 854 P.2d 527, 537 (Utah
1993). Consequently, this Court has held that language of indemnification cannot alone
confer third party beneficiary rights. Ron Case Roofing, 773 P.2d at 1387; see also42C.J.S.
Indemnity § 53 (1991) ("[0]ne not named as indemnitee may not sue on an indemnifying
instrument containing no promise to him/').
The 1994 Indemnification Agreement is clear on its face that neither Tremco nor
S.T.C. intended to create any benefit for BYU, but rather had the business purpose of
executing the agreement to remove uncertainty as to only S.T.C/s liabilities pending
purchase of its shares by WordPerfect. Accordingly, the agreement provides that the parties
sought only to "clarify the respective responsibilities of5 Tremco and S.T.C. and states:
"Tremco... shall indemnify and hold SoftSolutions [Technology Corporation] harmless
from any and all claims, damages or liabilities of any nature

" (R. 521-22 (emphasis

added).) The agreement merely provided Tremco would indemnify S.T.C. in the event
S.T.C. was held liable to BYU. The agreement did not bestow any benefit on BYU. Indeed,
by reciting that both parties disputed and worked to minimize B YU's claims, the agreement
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shows an affirmative intent to not benefit BYU.
BYU is not transformed into a third-party beneficiary if the agreement provides an
additional avenue from which BYU's potential future claims might ultimately be paid. That
argument was rejected by this Court in Broadwater, where it held that a bond purchased to
safeguard its purchasers against potential claims did not make the claimant a third-party
beneficiary of the bond. See Broadwater, 854 P.2d at 536-37. As the Court stated,
"Performance on the bond only incidentally benefits plaintiff by providing a fund from
which her damages may ultimately be paid." IdL at 536 (emphasis added). Because
Tremco's agreement with S.T.C. is merely for indemnification, as a matter of law, it does
not make BYU a third-party beneficiary.
Consequently, Tremco's agreement with S.T.C. does not make it liable for BYU's
subsequent award and judgment against SoftSolutions, Inc. The agreement's plain language
does not apply to SoftSolutions, Inc.'s liabilities, shows the parties had no intent to benefit
BYU, and actually sought to minimize BYU's ultimate recovery. Any incidental benefit to
BYU is insufficient to make BYU a third-party beneficiary.
VII.

THE COURT SHOULD REVERSE JUDGE HOWARD'S RULING THAT
THE SALE OF STOCK IN S.T.C. WAS A FRAUDULENT TRANSFER AND
VACATE THE ORDERS BASED THEREON BECAUSE SUCH ORDERS
ARE VOID AS RENDERED WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OR SUBJECT
MATTER JURISDICTION AND, AS A STOCK SALE, THERE WAS NO
TRANSFER OF SOFTSOLUTIONS, INC.'S OR S.T.C.'S ASSETS.
The basis for the July 10,2002 Order is Judge Howard's ruling that the sale of S.T.C.

stock to WordPerfect was a fraudulent transfer of SoftSolutions, Inc.'s and/or S.T.C.'s
assets. Since that ruling is erroneous, this Court should vacate the July 10, 2002 Order.
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First, the Court should vacate the July 10, 2002 Order that is based upon the ruling
that the sale of S.T.C. shares was a fraudulent transfer because that Order was entered in
violation of Tremco?s, SoftSolutions, Inc.'s and Duncan, et al.'s rights to procedural due
process. The July 10, 2002 Order authorizes execution on property owned by natural and
corporate persons who have never been named as party defendants in this action, never been
served a summons with such a complaint, never been served B YU's motions, and never been
provided any meaningful opportunity to be heard on whether the transfer was fraudulent,
and it was entered before the time in which Tremco was entitled to respond under Rule 4501 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration.
It is black letter law that before a court may adjudicate a person's right to their
property, that person must be named as a party and served with process. Zenith Radio Corp.
v. Hazeltine Research. Inc.. 395 U.S. 100, 110 (1960); see U.S. Const, Amend XIV, § 1;
Utah Const. Art. I, § 7. The record is clear that Duncan, et al., were never named as party
defendants in any complaint. This Court has expressly held that a determination that
property was received through a fraudulent transfer must be made only in a proceeding to
which the owner of that property is a party. Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d 1188, 1195 (Utah
1993) ("[S]ince the conveyance is not void, but merely voidable, the Burtons could not
simply disregard it and execute on the property."); see Tanakav.Nagata, 868 P.2d 450,454,
456 (Haw. 1994) (per curiam) (holding due process violated by declaring transfer fraudulent
in action to which transferee was not party).
Moreover, even if Duncan, et al. had been named as party defendants in a complaint,
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which they were not, there can be no imposition of liability upon them unless and until they
have been properly served with a summons. "In the absence of service of process (or waiver
of service by the defendant), a court may not exercise power over a party the complaint
names as defendant." Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344,350
(1999). Duncan, et al. have never been served a summons bringing them within the
jurisdiction of the district court.
Further, only Tremco's counsel was served with BYU's moving papers, not
SoftSolutions, Inc. or Duncan, et al., and Judge Howard entered the July 10,2002 Order two
days before expiration of the time in which Tremco was entitled to respond. See Utah R.
Jud. Admin. 4-501(l)(B) (providing ten business days to oppose a motion); Utah R. Civ. P.
6(e) (providing an additional three days for service by mail). Accordingly, the July 10,2002
Order was clearly entered without due process of law.
Second, the Court should vacate the July 10, 2002 Order because it was rendered
without subject matter jurisdiction. The law is clear that, as a result of Tremco's appeal,
Judge Howard was without jurisdiction to attempt to modify the May 14, 2002 Ruling and
the June 13, 2002 Judgment by imposing liability upon new parties. Cheves v. Williams,
1999 UT 86, Tf45, 993 P.2d 191; Hi-Countrv Estates v. Foothills Water, 942 P.2d 305, 306
(Utah 1996); Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 379
(1984). Because the July 10, 2002 Order changes the facts in the May 14, 2002 Ruling by
expanding the alleged unincorporated association from existing only between Tremco,
S.T.C., and SoftSolutions, Inc. to also including Duncan, et al., and changes the June 13,

48

2002 Judgment by expanding liability of Tremco only to liability of Tremco and Duncan,
et al., it was clearly entered without subject matter jurisdiction and it is absolutely void and
a complete nullity. See Stewart v. Donees, 915 F.2d 572, 579 (10th Cir. 1990) ("Because
the subsequent trial was conducted without jurisdiction, the court's judgment is without
effect."): Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons Co.. 817 P.2d 382.385 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Third, the Court should reverse the July 10, 2002 Order and Judge Howard's ruling
that the sale of shares in S.T.C. constituted a fraudulent transfer of S.T.C.'s and/or
SoftSolutions, Inc. assets because it is simply wrong. The sale was a stock sale, not an asset
sale, and SoftSolutions, Inc. was not the seller of the S.T.C. shares. Cf Prince v. Elm Inv.
Co., 649 P.2d 820, 823 (Utah 1982) ("A sale of stock should not... be equated with the sale
of a corporate asset.").
VIII. THERE WAS NO BASIS TO STRIKE THE DUNCAN AFFIDAVIT
The Court should reverse Judge Howard's ruling striking the Duncan Affidavit
because Judge Howard's legal determinations were wrong.
First, the Duncan Affidavit did not violate the parol evidence rule because it was not
submitted to vary the terms of any agreement at issue, but to provide factual background to
those agreements and evidence of the parties' intent in the event the agreements were found
to be ambiguous. Garrett v. Ellison. 93 Utah 184, 188, 72 P.2d 449, 451 (1937); see also
Hall v. Process Instruments & Control Inc.. 890 P.2d 1024,1026 (Utah 1995) ("This court
has noted that as a principle of contract interpretation, the parol evidence rule has a very
narrow application."). Second, the Duncan Affidavit is not inadmissible under "law of the
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case" as a result of it contradicting the prior record in the 1996 Case between SoftSolutions,
Inc. and BYU. Law of the case does not apply because consolidation of the 2000 Case into
the 1996 Case cannot affect Tremco's substantive rights. In re San Rafael River Drainage
Area, 844 P.2d 287,292 (Utah 1992) ('"A consolidation of actions does not affect the rights
of the parties.'") (citation omitted); 8 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice §
42.13 [2] (3d ed. 2000) ("The Supreme Court has held that consolidation does not merge the
consolidated suits into one lawsuit, change the rights of the parties, or make those who were
parties in one suit parties in another.") (citing Johnson v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 289 U.S. 479,
496-97 (1933)); Joan Steinman, Law of the Case: A Judicial Puzzle in Consolidated and
Transferred Cases and in Multidistrict Litigation, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 595,623 (1987) ("Rule
42 consolidation does not render rulings in one case also rulings 'in' the other consolidated
actions."). Third, the Duncan Affidavit was based upon personal knowledge because Mr.
Duncan, an officer of both Tremco and SoftSolutions, Inc. testified to his own and those
corporations' knowledge. Utah Farm Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Watts, 737 P.2d 154,157 (Utah
1987). Fourth, the Duncan Affidavit did not contain legal conclusions because it provided
only facts to which legal consequences attach and not the legal consequence that must result.
Pace v. Cummins Engine Co.. Inc.. 905 P.2d 308, 311 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, this Court should reverse the June 13, 2002 Judgment
against Tremco and remand for entry of summary judgment in Tremco's favor on BYU's
claims. Further, the Court should vacate the July 10, 2002 Order.
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Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1405 (2001)
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Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1408 (2001)

3.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 17

4.

1998 Judgment against SoftSolutions, Inc.

5.

1994 Indemnification Agreement

Tabl

REVISED BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT

16-10a-1405

16~10a-1405. Effect of dissolution.
(1) A dissolved corporation continues its corporate existence but may not
carry on any business except t h a t appropriate to wind up and liquidate its
business and affairs, including:
(a) collecting its assets;
(b) disposing of its properties t h a t will not be distributed in kind to its
shareholders;
(c) discharging or making provision for discharging its liabilities;
(d) distributing its remaining property among its shareholders according to their interests; and
(e) doing every other act necessary to wind u p and liquidate its business
and affairs.
(2) Dissolution of a corporation does not:
(a) transfer title to the corporation's property;
(b) prevent transfer of its shares or securities, although the authorization to dissolve may provide for closing the corporation's share transfer
records,
(c) subject its directors or officers to standards of conduct different from
those prescribed in Part 8;
(d) change:
(i) quorum or voting requirements for its board of directors or
shareholders;
(ii) provisions for selection, resignation, or removal of its directors
or officers or both; or
(iii) provisions for amending its bylaws or its articles of incorporation;
(e) prevent commencement of a proceeding by or against the corporation in its corporate name;
(f) abate or suspend a proceeding pending by or against the corporation
on the effective date of dissolution; or
(g) terminate the authority of the registered agent of the corporation.
History: C. 1953, 16-10a-1405, enacted by
L. 1992, ch. 277, % 156.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Directors
—Authority
Liability after dissolution
Partnerships
Trust fund doctrine
Quiet title action
Directors.
—Authority.
Board of directors in winding up affairs of
corporation on forfeiture of its charter had
authority to confess judgment on indebtedness
of the corporation Hennod v East Tintic Dev
C o , 52 Utah 245, 173 P 134 (1918)

Liability after dissolution.
Officers and directors who continue the business of a suspended corporation which has not
been reinstated are personally liable for all
debts and liabilities arising from those operations that are a continuation of the types of
activities the corporation performed Steenbhk
v Lichfield, 906 P2d 872 (Utah 1995) (decided
under former § 16-10-139)
Persons who act as if pursuant to valid corporate authority, after that authority has been
suspended, are personally responsible for liabilities arising from the continued operations,
and are jointly and severally liable with others
who know the corporation's authority is no
longer effective but continue its operations
Steenbhk v Lichfield, 906 P2d 872 (Utah 1995)
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16-10a-1406

CORPORATIONS

(decided under former § 16-10-139)
Partnerships.
By analogy to dissolved corporations under
t e s section, a partnership that was dissolved
upon the sale of real estate, but continued in
existence for the purpose of winding up business, retains the capacity to sue and be sued to
the extent necessary during the winding up
process. Arndt v. First Interstate Bank of Utah,
N.A., 1999 UT 91, 991 R2d 584.
™
.
Trust fund doctrineIn contemplation of law, corporate property,
in case of insolvency, was trust fund, first, for
payment of creditors, and, second, for distribution among stockholders, equally and ratably.
W.R Noble Mercantile Co. v. Mt. Pleasant Equitable Co-op. Inst., 12 Utah 213, 42 P. 869

(1895), appeal dismissed, 17 S. Ct. 996. 41 L.
Ed. 1180(1896).
Where corporation dissolved and, without
fi^t ]j q u i dating its liabilities, made distribution of its property among its stockholders,
court of equity would convert all holders of such
property, except bona fide purchasers for value,
into trustees for creditors and compel such
trustees to account to extent of property so in
their hands. W.R Noble Mercantile Co. v. Mt.
Pleasant Equitable Co-op. Inst., 12 Utah 213,
42 P. 869 (1895), appeal dismissed, 17 S. Ct.
996y 4 1 L E d n 8 0 (1896x
Quiet title action.
Dissolved corporation could maintain an action to quiet title. Falconaero Enter.. Inc. v.
Valley Investment Co , 16 Utah 2d 77, 395 R2d
915 U964).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 19 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations
§ 2838 et seq.
C.J.S. — 19 C J S. Corporations § 862 et seq.

A.L.R. — Liability of shareholders, directors,
and officers where corporate business is continued after its dissolution, 72 A.L.R.4th 419

16-10a-1406. Disposition of known claims by notification.
(1) A dissolved corporation may dispose of the known claims against it by
following the procedures described in this section.
(2) A dissolved corporation electing to dispose of known claims pursuant to
this section may give written notice of the dissolution to known claimants at
any time after the effective date of the dissolution. The written notice must:
(a) describe the information t h a t must be included in a claim;
(b) provide an address to which written notice of any claim must be
given to the corporation;
(c) state the deadline, which may not be fewer than 120 days after the
effective date of the notice, by which the dissolved corporation must
receive the claim; and
(d) state t h a t unless sooner barred by any other state statute limiting
actions, the claim will be barred if not received by the deadline.
(3) Unless sooner barred by any other s t a t u t e limiting actions, a claim
against the dissolved corporation is barred if:
(a) a claimant was given notice under Subsection (2) and the claim is
not received by the dissolved corporation by the deadline; or
(b) the dissolved corporation delivers to the claimant w r ritten notice of
rejection of the claim within 90 days after receipt of the claim and the
claimant whose claim wras rejected by the dissolved corporation does not
commence a proceeding to enforce the claim within 90 days after the
effective date of the rejection notice.
(4) Claims which are not rejected by the dissolved corporation in writing
within 90 days after receipt of the claim by the dissolved corporation shall be
considered accepted.
(5) The failure of the dissolved corporation to give notice to any known
claimant pursuant to Subsection (2) does not affect the disposition under this
section of any claim held by any other known claimant.
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REVISED BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT

16-10a-1408

(6) For purposes of this section, "claim" does not include a contingent
liability or a claim based on an event occurring after the effective date of
dissolution.
History: C. 1953,16-10a-1406* enacted by
L. 1992, ch. 277, § 157.

16-10a-1407.

Disposition of claims by publication.

(1) A dissolved corporation may publish notice of its dissolution and request
that persons with claims against the corporation present them in accordance
with the notice.
(2) The notice contemplated in Subsection (1) must:
(a) be published one time in a newspaper of general circulation in the
county where the dissolved corporation's principal office or, if it has no
principal office in this state, its registered office is or was last located;
(b) describe the information that must be included in a claim and
provide an address at which any claim must be given to the corporation;
and
(c) state that unless sooner barred by any other statute limiting actions,
the claim will be barred if an action to enforce the claim is not commenced
within five years after the publication of the notice.
(3) If the dissolved corporation publishes a newspaper notice in accordance
with Subsection (2), then unless sooner barred under Section 16-10a-1406 or
under any other statute limiting actions, the claim of any claimant against the
dissolved corporation is barred unless the claimant commences an action to
enforce the claim against the dissolved corporation within five years after the
publication date of the notice.
(4) (a) For purposes of this section, "claim" means any claim, including
claims of this state, whether known, due or to become due, absolute or
contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, founded on contract, tort, or other
legal basis, or otherwise.
(b) For purposes of this section, an action to enforce a claim includes
any civil action, and any arbitration under any agreement for binding
arbitration between the dissolved corporation and the claimant.
History: C. 1953,16-10a-1407, enacted by
L. 1992, ch. 277, § 158.

16-10a-1408. Enforcement of claims against dissolved
corporations.
A claim may be enforced:
(1) under Section 16-10a-1406 or 16-10a-1407 against the dissolved
corporation, to the extent of its undistributed assets; or
(2) against a shareholder of the dissolved corporation, if the assets have
been distributed in liquidation; but a shareholder's total liability for all
claims under this section may not exceed the total value of assets
distributed to him, as that value is determined at the time of distribution.
Any shareholder required to return any portion of the value of assets
received by him in liquidation shall be entitled to contribution from all
other shareholders. The contributions shall be in accordance with the
507

16-10a-1409

CORPORATIONS

shareholders' respective rights and interests and may not exceed the value
of the assets received in liquidation.
History: C. 1953,16-10a-1408, enacted by
L. 1992, ch. 277, § 159; 1996, ch. 79, § 17.

16-10a-1409. Service on dissolved corporation,
(1) A dissolved corporation shall either:
(a) maintain a registered agent in this state to accept service of process
on its behalf; or
(b) be deemed to have authorized service of process on it by registered
or certified mail, return receipt requested, to the address of its principal
office, if any, as set forth in its articles of dissolution or as last changed by
notice delivered to the division for filing or to the address for service of
process that is stated in its articles of dissolution or as last changed by
notice delivered to the division for filing.
(2) Service effected pursuant to Subsection (l)(b) is perfected at the earliest
of:
(a) the date the dissolved corporation receives the process, notice, or
demand;
(b) the date shown on the return receipt, if signed on behalf of the
dissolved corporation; or
(c) five days after mailing.
(3) Subsection (1) does not prescribe the only means, or necessarily the
required means, of service on a dissolved corporation.
History: C. 1953,16-10a-1409, enacted by
L. 1992, ch. 277, § 160.

16-10a-1420. Grounds for administrative dissolution.
The division may commence a proceeding under Section 16-10a-1421 for
administrative dissolution of a corporation if:
(1) the corporation does not pay when they are due any taxes, fees, or
penalties imposed by this chapter or other applicable laws of this state;
(2) the corporation does not deliver a corporate or annual report to the
division when it is due;
(3) the corporation is without a registered agent or registered office in
this state;
(4) the corporation does not give notice to the division that its registered
agent or registered office has been changed, that its registered agent has
resigned, or that its registered office has been discontinued; or
(5) the corporation's period of duration stated in its articles of incorporation expires.
History: C. 1953,16-10a-1420, enacted by
L. 1992, ch. 277, § 161.
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(d) Associates may sue or be sued by common name. When two or more
persons associated m any business either as a joint-stock company, a partnership or other association, not a corporation, transact such business under a
common name, whether it comprises the names of such associates or not, they
may sue or be sued by such common name. Any judgment obtained against the
association shall bind the joint property of all the associates in the same
manner as if all had been named parties and had been sued upon their joint
liability The separate property of an individual member of the association may
not be bound by the judgment unless the member is named as a party and the
court acquires jurisdiction over the member.
(e) Action against a nonresident doing business in this state. When a
nonresident person is associated in and conducts business within the state of
Utah in one or more places in that person's own name or a common trade name,
and the business is conducted under the supervision of a manager, superintendent or agent the person may be sued in the person's name in any action
arising out of the conduct of the business.
(f) As used in these rules, the term plaintiff shall include a petitioner, and
the term defendant shall include a respondent.
(Amended effective September 1, 1991; April 1, 1998.)
Advisory Committee Note. — Paragraph
(d) has been changed to conform to the holding
m Cottonwood Mall Co u Sine, 767 P2d 499
(Utah 1988), which allows an unincorporated
association to sue m its own name The rule
continues to allow an unincorporated association to be sued m its own name The final
sentence of paragraph (d) was added to confirm
t h a t the separate property of an individual
member of an association may not be bound by
the ludgment unless the member is made a
party
Technical changes in all paragraphs of the
rule make the terminology gender neutral In

part (c) the word "minor" has replaced the word
''infant," in order to maintain consistency with
recent changes made m Rule 4(eX2) In Rule 4
an infant is defined as a person under the age of
14 years, whereas the intent of Rule 17(c) is to
include persons under the age of 18 years
Amendment Notes. — The 1998 amendment added Subdivision (0
Compiler's Notes. — Subdivisions (a) and
(b) of this rule are similar to Rule 17(a) and (c),
FRCP
Cross-References. — Guardians, § 75-5101 et seq
Service of process, U R C P 4

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Associates
—Joint venture
—Unincorporated association
Common name
Minors
—Action for injury of minor
— Control by couit
—Failure to comply
Relief from judgment
—Service on parents
Nonresident doing business in state
—Not found
Real party in interest
—Assignee
—Corporation
Assignment of assets to another corporation
Foreign corporation
Shareholder
— Divorce cases
— Insurance company
— Joint tort feasors
— Partner m joint venture
— Purpose of rule
—Trust beneficiary
—Wife
—Wrongful death action
Cited

Associates.
— J o i n t venture.
Joint venturers may sue m the name of the
joint venture Cottonwood Mall Co v Sine, 767
P2d 499 (Utah 1988)
—Unincorporated association.
An unincorporated, voluntary environmental
watch-dog association fell within the purview of
the "other association" language of Subdivision
(d), acting under a common name for several
years in monitoring and working to improve air
quality in the county, they were likely transacting business Graham v Davis County Solid
Waste Mgt & Energy Recovery Special Serv
D i s t , 1999 UT App 136, 979 P2d 363, cert
denied, 994 P 2 d 1271 (Utah 1999)
Although an unincorporated voluntary association had the power to sue under this rule, it
was nonetheless required to register as an
association conducting business under an assumed name, and failure to register subjected it
to a bar against maintaining an action in any
court of the state Graham v Davis County
Solid Waste Mgt & Energy Recovery Special
Serv Dist, 1999 UT App 136, 979 P 2 d 363,
cert denied, 994 P2d 1271 (Utah 1999>
Common name.
Banks that continued to run a shopping cen-

ter after foreclosing on a loan to the developer
could not be sued under the name of the shopping center, as the banks did not transact
business or hold themselves out to the public
under that name. Hebertson v. Willowcreek
Plaza, 895 R2d 839 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), aiTd,
923 R2d 1389 (Utah 1996).
The name of a building owned by parties
transacting business together, even if the business transactions related solely to the building,
is not enough to establish that the parties were
transacting business under the name of the
building for purposes of this rule. Hebertson v.
Willowcreek Plaza, 923 P.2d 1389 (Utah 1996)
(afFg 895 R2d 839 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)).
Although the two defendant banks transacted business together, including assuming
title to property and entering leases with various tenants for portions of the property, where
there was no evidence to show t h a t the parties
transacted business under the name accorded
to their property, the "common name" provision
in this rule did not apply. Hebertson v.
Willowcreek Plaza, 923 P.2d 1389 (Utah 1996)
(afFg 895 P2d 839 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)).
Minors.
—Action for injury of minor.
Under this rule, mother as guardian ad litem
for benefit of father could bring action for
injuries to sixteen-year-old son where father,
an immigrant, had a somewhat limited use of
English and business matters were mainly
handled by the mother; § 78-11-6 providing for
suit by father was not exclusive remedy.
Skollingsberg v. Brookover, 26 Utah 2d 45, 484
R2d 1177 (1971).
—Control by court.
A guardian ad litem appointed pursuant to
Subdivision (b) is subject to the control of the
court. Skollingsberg v. Brookover, 26 Utah 2d
45, 484 P.2d 1177 (1971).
—Failure t o comply.
Relief from judgment.
The plea of infancy is a personal privilege
which may be waived and, without a showing of
fraud, collusion, or other substantial error going to the merits of the case, a minor defendant
is not entitled to be relieved of the judgment
against her on the basis of infancy. Whitney v.
Walker, 25 Utah 2d 202, 479 P.2d 469 (1971).
—Service on p a r e n t s .
The validity of an amendment turns on actual notice, not on whether process has been
served. The trial court erred in not permitting
an amendment to a complaint when both minor
defendants had notice of the claim by virtue of
service on their legal guardians, who had been
served at the boys' homes. Sulzen v. Williams,
1999 UT App 76, 977 P 2 d 497.
Nonresident d o i n g business in state.
—Not found.
A nonresident who enters into contracts with
entertainers who agree to perform at Utah
schools in accordance with schedules arranged
by him, and to collect for the performances, is

not conducting business in Utah, either himself
or through the entertainers, within meaning of
this rule. Alward v. Green, 122 Utah 35, 245
P.2d 855 (1952).
Real party in interest.
—Assignee.
An assignee is the real party in interest.
Lynch v. MacDonald, 12 Utah 2d 427, 367 P 2 d
464 (1962).
—Corporation.
Assignment of assets t o another corporation.
In action for alleged breach of loan agreement, dismissal of action on ground that plaintiff corporation was not real party in interest
was error, since plaintiff corporation's assignment of all right, title and interest to all of its
assets and unliquidated claims to another corporation did not include assignment of instant
cause of action. M & S Constr. & Eng>g Co. v.
Clearfield State Bank, 24 Utah 2d 139,467 P.2d
410 (1970).
Foreign corporation.
The owner of a business is not precluded from
enforcing a covenant not to compete merely
because foreign corporation, disqualified from
suing, may also have an interest in the contract
and may incidentally derive an indirect benefit
from the enforcement of the owner's rights.
Shaw v. Jeppson, 121 Utah 155, 239 P2d 745
(1952).
Shareholder.
Even though a shareholder owns all, or practically all, of the stock in a corporation, such a
fact does not authorize him to sue as an individual for a wrong done by a third party to the
corporation. Norman v. Murray First Thrift &
Loan Co., 596 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1979).
—Divorce cases.
Attorney's attempt to alter a divorce decree
to provide t h a t attorney's fees be paid directly
to him was not a permissible procedure.
McDonald v. McDonald, 866 P.2d 1253 (Utah
Ct. App. 1993).
—Insurance company.
Where purchaser of real estate was reimbursed by title insurance company for flaw in
vendor's title, only insurance company, and not
purchaser, was real party in interest entitled to
bring action against vendor. Haueter v.
Peguillan, 586 P2d 403 (Utah 1978).
— J o i n t tort-feasors.
Joint tort-feasors, where liability is joint and
severable, are neither indispensable nor necessary parties. Lynch v. MacDonald, 12 Utah 2d
427, 367 P 2 d 464 Q962).
—Partner in joint venture.
In suit by partner in a joint venture against
potential investors in the venture for interference with contract, interference with prospective economic advantage, and breach of agreement, the partner was required to either name
the partnership as party in interest or join his
partner as an indispensable party in interest.

Kemp v. Murray, 680 P.2d 758 (Utah 1984).
— P u r p o s e of rule.
A defendant has the right to have a cause of
action prosecuted by the real party in interest
so t h a t the judgment will preclude any action
on the same demand by another, and so t h a t the
defendant will be permitted to assert all defenses or counterclaims available against the
real owner of the cause. Shaw v. Jeppson, 121
Utah 155. 239 P.2d 745 (1952).
—Trust beneficiary.
Although this rule clearly allows the trustee
to sue on behalf of the beneficiary, it does not
prevent the beneficiary from suing third parties
directly. Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc., 841 P.2d 742 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), cert,
denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993).
A trust beneficiary has standing to bring suit
against third parties for the improper distribution of stock in the trust if he or she can show
t h a t the trustee improperly refused or neglected to bring an action against the third
parties. Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc., 841 R2d 742 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), cert,
denied. 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993).
—Wife.
Where the husband sued to set aside a fraud-

ulent transaction in which he had loaned $5000
to the defendant's corporation from funds in his
business account in exchange for a note payable
to husband and wife jointly, the wife was not an
indispensable party plaintiff even though she
replenished her husband's business account
with their joint bavings, since the false representations were made only to the husband and
the wife took no other part in the transaction.
Greenwell v. Duvall, 9 Utah 2d 89. 338 R2d 118
(1959). —Wrongful death action.
Because decedent's estate had no capacity to
bring an action for wrongful death, t h e complaint was a nullity and there remained no
cause of action in which to substitute parties;
therefore, the trial court did not err in denying
plaintiff's motion to substitute real parties in
interest. Estate of Haro v. Haro, 887 R2d 878
(Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Cited in Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain Fuel
Supply Co., 676 R2d 952 (Utah 1984); Intermountain Physical Medicine Assocs. v. MicroDex Corp., 739 R2d 1131 (Utah Ct. App. 1987);
Empire Land Title, Inc. v. Weyerhaeuser Mtg.
Co., 797 R2d 467 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Utah's Statute of
Limitation Barring Minors from Bringing Medical Malpractice Actions: Riding Roughshod
over the Rights of Minors?, 1992 Utah L. Rev.
929.
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Tort Law, 1995 Utah L. Rev. 1.
A m . Jur. 2d. — 6 Am. Jur. 2d Associations
and Clubs §§ 50, 51; 36 Am. Jur. 2d Foreign
Corporations § 193 et seq.; 53 Am. Jur. 2d
Mentally Impaired Persons § 170 et seq.: 42
Am. Jur. 2d Infants §§ 155 et seq., 175; 59 Am.
Jur. 2d Parties §§ 31, 38 to 44, 249 to 252, 255;
60 Am. Jur. 2d Partnership § 324.
C.J.S. — 7 C.J.S. Associations §§ 36, 38; 20
C.J.S. Corporations § 1828 et seq.; 43 C.J.S.
Infants §§ 108, 110; 67 C.J.S. Parties §§ 17,
18, 133 to 138; 68 C.J.S. Partnership § 184 et
seq.
A.L.R. — Proper party plaintiff, under real
party in interest statute, to action against tortfeasor for damage to insured property where
insured has paid part of loss, 13 A.L.R.3d 140.
Proper party plaintiff, under real party in
interest statute, to action against tort-feasor
for damage to insured property where loss is
entirely covered by insurance, 13 A.L.R.3d 229.
State Consumer Protection Act, right to pri-

vate action under, 62 A.L.R.3d 169.
Who is minor's next of kin for guardianship
purposes, 63 A.L.R.3d 813.
Bailor's right of direct action against bailee's
theft insurer for loss of bailed property, 64
A.L.R.3d 1207.
Proper party plaintiff in action for injury to
common areas of condominium development,
69 A.L.R.3d 1148.
Necessary or proper parties to suit or proceeding to establish private boundary line, 73
A.L.R.3d 948.
Necessity of requiring presence in court of
both parties in proceedings relating to custody
or visitation of children, 15 A.L.R.4th 864.
Right of illegitimate child to maintain action
to determine paternity, 19 A.L.R.4th 1082.
Required parties in adoption proceedings, 48
A.L.R.4th 860.
Joint venture's capacity to sue, 56 A.L.R.4th
1234.
Standing to bring action relating to real property of condominium, 74A.L.R.4th 165.
Power of incompetent spouse's guardian or
representative to sue for granting or vacation of
divorce or annulment of marriage, or to make
compromise or settlement in such suit, 32
A.L.R.5th 673.

Rule 18. Joinder of claims and remedies.
(a) Joinder of claims. The plaintiff in his complaint or in a reply setting forth
a counterclaim and the defendant in an answer setting forth a counterclaim
may join either as independent or as alternate claims as many claims either
legal or equitable or both as he may have against an opposing party. There may
be a like joinder of claims when there are multiple parties if the requirements
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PART IV. PARTIES
Rule 17. P a r t i e s plaintiff a n d defendant.
(a) Real party in interest. Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the
real party in interest. An executor, administrator, guardian, bailee, trustee of
an express trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract has been
made for the benefit of another, or a party authorized by statute may sue in
that person's name without joining the party for whose benefit the action is
brought; and when a statute so provides, an action for the use or benefit of
another shall be brought in the name of the state of Utah. No action shall be
dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the real party
in interest until a reasonable time h a s been allowed after objection for
ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or substitution of, the
real party in interest; and such ratification, joinder, or substitution shall have
the same effect as if the action had been commenced in the name of the real
party in interest.
(b) Minors or incompetent persons, A minor or an insane or incompetent
person who is a party must appear either by a general guardian or by a
guardian ad litem appointed in the particular case by the court in which the
action is pending. A guardian ad litem may be appointed in any case when it
is deemed by the court in which the action or proceeding is prosecuted
expedient to represent the minor, insane or incompetent person in the action or
proceeding, notwithstanding that the person may have a general^guardian and
may have appeared by the guardian. In an action in rem it shall not be
necessary to appoint a guardian ad litem for any unknown party who might be
a minor or an incompetent person.
(c) Guardian ad litem; how appointed. A guardian ad litem appointed by a
court must be appointed as follows:
(1) When the minor is plaintiff, upon the application of the minor, if the
minor is of the age of fourteen years, or if under that age, upon the application
of a relative or friend of the minor.
(2) When the minor is defendant, upon the application of the minor if the
minor is of the age of fourteen years and applies within 20 days after the
service of the summons, or if under t h a t age or if the minor neglects so to apply,
then upon the application of a relative or friend of the minor, or of any other
party to the action.
(3) When a minor defendant resides out of this state, the plaintiff, upon
motion therefor, shall be entitled to an order designating some suitable person
to be guardian ad litem for the minor defendant, unless the defendant or
someone in behalf of the defendant within 20 days after service of notice of
such motion shall cause to be appointed a guardian for such minor. Service of
such notice may be made upon the defendant's general or testamentary
guardian located in the defendant's state; if there is none, such notice, together
with the summons in the action, shall be served in the manner provided for
publication of summons upon such minor, if over fourteen years of age. or. if
under fourteen years of age, by such service on the person with whom the
minor resides. The guardian ad litem for such nonresident minor defendant
shall have 20 days after appointment in which to plead to the action.
(4) When an insane or incompetent person is a party to an action or
proceeding, upon the application of a relative or friend of such insane or
incompetent person, or of any other party to the action or proceeding.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Bngham Young
University shall have judgment against SoftSolutions, Inc as follows
1

For past royalties due and owing m the amount of $1,672,467 00,

2

For interest on the sum of $1,672,467 00 at the contract rate of 18% per annum,

from July 3, 1996 to the date of the entry of this Judgment, and thereafter at the contract rate of
18 % per annum
3

For attorney's fees awarded as a part of the original arbitration award in the amount

of $115,000 00, uiterest thereon from July 3, 1996 to the date of entry of this Judgment at the rate
of 7 61% from July 3 to December 31. 1996 at the rate of 7 81% from January 1, 1997 to
December 31, 1997, and at the rate of 7 23% from January 1, 1998 to the date of entry of this
Judgment and thereafter at the legal rate established by § 15-1-4 U C A
4

An additional award of attorney's fees of $28,987 50 made pursuant to this Court's

rulings dated February 9, 1998 and May 19, 1998, with interest thereon at the judgment rate as
established by §15-1-4 U C A

DATED this

7 ^ day of EW1998

0*\G»WA£

/.

Approved to as to form

Jay Peck
David Hartvigsen
Attorneys for SoftSolutions Inc

0?3^
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AGREEMENT
THIS AGREEMENT is made and entered into as of this
day

of January,

CORPORATION

1994f by and

a Utah

between

corporation

SOFTSOLUTIONS

l&

TECHNOLOGY

("SoftSolutions") , and

TREMCO

CONSULTANTS, INC., a Utah corporation ("TreBico") R E C I T A L S :
A.

Prior to the date

hereofr

certain disputes

have

arisen with respect to claims by Brigham Young University (,fBYUM)
as to royalties claimed owing under license arrangements regarding
the DSearch algorhythm.
B-

Tremco has been involved in defending that action

and has, itself, asserted various claims against BYU as offsets or
absolute defenses.
C.

The parties hereto desire to clarify the respective

responsibilities of the companies with respect to the BYU claims.
NOW THEREFORE, for and
promises

and

covenants

herein

in consideration of- the mutual
contained,

and

other

good

and

valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are
hereby acknowledged, the parties agree and represent as follows:
1.

Tremco consents and acknowledges that Tremco is the

responsible party with respect

to the BYU claims and is solely

responsible for the defense and pursuit of claims with respect to
that matter.
costs

and

27W7.DU5B9.y5

In connection

expenses

of every

therewith, Tremco shall assume all
nature,

including legal costs

and

expenses with respect to the current disputes with BYV and shall
indemnify and hold SoftSolutions harmless from any and all claims,
damages or liabilities of any nature, including but not limited to
costs and attorneys' fees, stemming from or in connection withf BYU
claims with respect to the DSearch algorhythm.
2.

Sof tSolutions agrees reasonably to cooperate with

Tremco to provide information and to make reasonably available for
interview and assistance employees and personnel having knowledge
or information in this regard.
SOFTSOLUTIONS TECHNOLOGY
CORPORATION f a Utah corporation
By:_

£(£<&&//Cc&

Its:
TREMCO

CONSULTANTS f

corporation
fly:_

Its:

i7W7.UUJ8¥.9S

-2-

AM*
V>U P'tJtXA

INC.,

a

Utah

